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Executive Summary 
This workshop, held at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, December 3-7, 2007, was 
a continuation of an ongoing sequence of meetings in connection with a “grass roots” effort to 
create a 10-year research plan for the protection of our national cyber critical infrastructure from 
strategic damage.  The purpose of the plan us to realize our vision—transform the cyber-
infrastructure to be resistant to attack so that critical national interests are protected from 
catastrophic damage and our society can confidently adopt new technological advances.  This 
would be accomplished in such a way as to create a lever to enhance U.S. high-tech 
competitiveness, attract top students into strong educational programs, and strengthen 
government, industry and academic research. This workshop report is being received as input 
into the important research component of a nascent National initiative.  
The motivation for the sequence of workshops and the resulting research plan is:   
• Our Nation’s critical infrastructures (power, oil and gas, telecommunications, and others) 
are vulnerable to cyber attacks, particularly by determined adversaries 
• Although there has been considerable research in computer security that has led to 
technology that addresses many current threats, there is little technology available to 
cope with determined adversaries 
• The vulnerabilities to be considered are numerous and diverse and thus must be dealt 
with across the spectrum of critical software, hardware, configuration, policies and 
procedures 
• Pioneering government sponsored research has led to the creation of entire industry 
market sectors such as firewall products, virus detectors, and intrusion detection systems. 
The accomplishments of ongoing research programs and new technology under 
development in industry, academia and government are impressive and provide the basis 
for a successful research initiative.   
• Along with security, privacy concerns have to be respected 
• To be successful, the research initiative resulting in technology has to take into account 
issues including economic, legal, usability of new technology, and the creation of a 
workforce to create and make effective use of the technology 
• Much of the previous and ongoing research in computer security and privacy, as funded 
by the traditional U.S agencies, is centered around relatively small projects, often 
disconnected from the U.S. industry that will have to produce and make use of new 
technology. Larger efforts should be pursued, driven by the security needs of critical 
applications – today’s but also those anticipated to be critical 20 years in the future.   
• A research effort is needed that is a partnership between the traditional research 
communities and the industries that will develop and use the technology, but for which 
considerable leadership is provided by the Government.  
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• By itself, the current security research agenda will not provide all the technology needed 
for our Nation’s critical resources fundamentally because the scale of the effort is not 
commensurate with the magnitude of the problem. 
As a step toward the security research plan, this workshop was organized to provide capabilities, 
end-states, and moves. The purpose of this structure is to force a fresh perspective that includes 
the big strategic picture and connects clearly to strategic actions that significantly mitigate 
strategic vulnerabilities. A capability is an ability to defend cyberspace from the perspective of a 
strategic decision maker.  It answers the question of how the cyber defense world would be 
different from an operational perspective.. An end-state is the concept of operation providing 
context for a capability, again from the perspective of a strategic decision maker.  For example, 
if the nation has a capability to quickly recover its critical information infrastructure, then the 
end-state is that strategic attack damages are mitigated and critical services are restored quickly, 
possibly deterring adversaries from attempting the attack in the future. A move is a strategic 
action to mitigate a strategic risk in cyber defense and that contributes toward a higher-level goal 
such as a capability or end-state.   
Preliminary results were discussed with a small group of industry and government experts to 
establish the initial conclusions and recommendations¸ though broader review and involvement 
is needed. Further work is needed to describe the structure of the major research program to 
achieve the end-states.  Overall, the workshop’s attendees are optimistic that a focused research 
effort can produce new technology that sets the stage for industry adoption of significantly more 
secure and dependable critical systems.   
Desired End-States  
The workshop identified end-states, the outcomes over a 10-year research effort to create critical 
capabilities.  A sine qua non of the effort was the creation of systems consistent with privacy 
expectations in our democracy.  The end states are presented below in no special order. 
• Continuity of Critical Information Infrastructure Operations. Technology that would be 
the basis for a resilient US cyber infrastructure that would sustain critical functions in the 
face of attacks, including those that could be effected by determined adversaries.  
• Well-Defended Critical Assets. Make it economically prohibitive for an adversary to cause 
strategic damage to the US critical infrastructure.  Currently, adversaries can attack critical 
systems without investing substantial resources. 
• Local/Global Cyber Situation Awareness.  Know what’s on critical system platforms, 
what’s connected to the network, who’s on the network, the traffic flowing over it, and the 
threats to them. Create cyber early warning systems while maintaining privacy protections 
for citizens.  Move from today’s intrusion detection systems that can see simple previously-
seen attacks locally, to much more effective ones that can see highly-sophisticated, novel, 
covert strategic attacks against information infrastructure. 
• Confidentiality-Preserving Systems.  Prevent unauthorized access and exfiltration of 
critical information and intellectual property. Ensure accountability for information flows 
within systems so that information is shared with those intended to have it.  Much highly 
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valuable information is being lost from today’s systems protected by perimeter devices such 
as firewalls.  New mechanisms and architectures are needed. 
• Extensible systems that safely embrace new technology. New functions can be 
confidently added without compromising existing function or assurance.  Cyber defense 
technology and secure systems engineering needs to be advanced to the stage that it is a 
highly-usable enabler for the rapid pace of new functionality, such as the military’s Net-
Centric warfare, instead of an impediment. 
• Metrics-based Quantifiable security: Where possible, create the ability to quantitatively 
or even qualitatively determine the extent to which critical systems can withstand attacks 
based upon realistic assumptions.  Without such metrics, it is hard to judge progress and 




To achieve the aforementioned capabilities, the workshop identified key research activities: 
• Embrace architectural principles that enable the creation and operation of secure 
systems. Organize networks and systems physically and logically so that fall-back operations 
and rapid recovery and repair from attacks, even of an unanticipated nature, are possible.  As 
a policy, favor stratified/partitioned designs for critical security components. Re-organize 
networks that have moved away from these concepts.  Separate critical data and functions of 
the control plane from the operational plane.  Develop special-purpose security devices in 
critical areas to provide high-assurance protection functionality. 
• Design systems to satisfy critical mission requirements. Value and prioritize critical cyber 
infrastructure functions.  As functions are automated and integrated, demand that the cost of 
operating without the function (e.g. its vulnerability to cyber attack) be calculated as a means 
of assessing its mission-criticality. Quantify recovery and rollback. 
• Create and combine Metrics-Driven security analysis, simulations, and testing. Develop 
adequate test and analysis environments to vet theories of defense, cyber offense, new 
mechanisms, and operators using the best cyber strategy and tactics.  Different test 
environments, with a range of scales will be needed.  Some may need to be domain-specific.  
Numerous test-beds are under development, but need to be significantly improved, for 
example to be more usable and to provide data and tools to support experiments, and for 
further integration.  
• Exploit authentication and attestation mechanisms to establish trust and justify 
suspicion.  Authentication of individuals to each other and to machines, and machines to 
individuals and to other machines is required to establish trust, especially in new 
environments in which mobility is the norm.   Trustworthy identity combined with privacy-
protecting mechanisms is a prerequisite for security policy enforcement and for mechanisms 
such as network admission control.  
• Develop human capital. Inaugurate national competitions in secure system engineering to 
attract new talent and integrate academic, industry, and government efforts. Create 
unclassified national security research institutes with academic, private, and government 
players. Revamp research funding processes to encourage long-term, focused engagement in 
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crucial areas. Increase funding in areas that will create a cyber workforce of researchers, 
system developers, and system administrators for commercial and Government-critical 
systems.  
• Initiate research in key technology areas. A few  candidate areas include:  
o practical techniques and tools for the secure composition of large-scale architectures, to 
support safe system design, extension and evaluation,  
o transparent security mechanisms, to enable rather than interfere with work, 
o active automated forensics, to identify attackers and account for their actions,  
o self-healing and dynamic security, to raise the bar for attackers,  
o system security benchmarking and assessment to develop quantifiable metrics  
Conclusions 
• A focus on protection of the most critical information infrastructure elements from 
strategic damage is essential. 
• Connecting a bottom-up “moves” approach with a top-down “end-state” approach 
broadened thinking, yet quickly brought focus on key strategic moves and will produce new 
technology that meets the needs of critical applications. See slides for example analysis. 
• Developing and sustaining human capital (smart, well-trained people) is essential to all 
important endeavors in both the near- and long-term. 
• A strategy for understanding and influencing commercial markets is a prerequisite of 
any move.  Industry should be actively engaged in developing this strategy. Pragmatic 
solutions and incentives are needed.  Some of the key vendors are fully engaged in the 
research planning process, but more have to be involved and soon.  
• We should be careful not to undervalue ideas and concepts as “old” because they have 
been previously identified and discussed.  Many have never actually been tried in earnest 
and translation of these notions to the current context will be required.  Based on advances 
in underlying hardware and software technology the workshop participants believe that 
many of the key ideas are ready to be incorporated into design and evaluation 
methodologies.  To accomplish the ambitious goals, a concerted community effort is needed 
where researchers, academics, internet service providers, business leaders, government 
leaders, industry technical leaders all work in close partnership. 
 
Recommendations for Next Steps 
o Fund the continuation of the analysis process started in this workshop with a handful of 
very experienced people in the field with security engineering, research, and operational 
backgrounds.  Identify the most critical moves and lay out actions over the near, medium 
and long term for those moves. 
o Examine moves for which there were no corresponding end-states to determine their 
importance and relevance and to determine if any important goal states are missing.  
Examine important moves identified by prior studies in the same way with respect to 
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missing moves and end-states.  For example, usability of security plays a key role, yet is 
not yet well-mapped into the workshop results. 
o Explore the possible quantification of end-states so that investment might be prioritized. 
o Engage a cadre of top key technical leaders from industry from the beginning to 
determine ways to affect change consistent with the mechanisms and behavior of 
commercial markets and to propose effective incentives. 
o Hold a series of follow-on workshops over the next 12 months with domain experts (e.g. 
power, banking, and telecommunications), technology experts, and industry experts to 
extend the plan.  Involve Government agencies responsible for security R&D and for 
these sectors, initially through the National Coordination Office’s (NCO’s) Cyber 
Security and. Information Assurance (CSIA) group. 
 
Workshop Background and Organization 
 
The National Cyber Defense Initiative (NCDI), the workshop organizer, is a grassroots activity 
started in late November 2006 to address the need for a large-scale effort to improve the cyber 
security of our nation. Thirty-four invited specialists and a small number of reviewers attended. 
The former were at the workshop for the entire week, whereas the latter attended only the last 
day.  All participants were cyber security experts.  Their backgrounds included: industry, 
government, and academia .  The principle organizers of the workshop were Cynthia Irvine 
(Naval Postgraduate School) and Sami Saydjari (Cyber Defense Agency, LLC). Three pre-
chosen facilitators lead breakout groups: Terry Benzel (USC/ISI), Deborah Cooper (private 
consultant), and Bridget Rogers (Sandia).  Sponsorship for travel costs and facilities came from 
NPS, IARPA, NSF, and ONR. 
 
The workshop organized the participants into three breakout groups each of which focused on a 
set of high-level objectives. Plenary sessions were limited to talks that highlighted the critical 
nature of the cyber security problem, the challenge cyber security poses in the context of existing 
infrastructure and practice, and for inter-group synchronization.  The approach was both bottom-
up regarding strategic actions (called moves) that can and should be taken to make a significant 
reduction in risk, and top-down in terms of end-state operational capabilities needed to achieve 
information dominance. 
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1. Introduction 
The objective of the meeting was to sketch an action-oriented National Cyber Defense Project 
Plan for near, mid, and long terms.  Identify Key Capabilities and roadmap to get there. 
 
Originally we conceived of three parallel working groups organized in terms of time frame: short 
(3-5 yrs.), medium (5-7 yrs.), and long, (7-10 yrs.).  Identify prioritized moves/action, flesh out 
the top 10 strategic moves, map moves to risk mitigation of some concrete problems.  The 
timeframes ended up being too constraining to group creativity so we dropped them early on as 
described below. 
 
Along the way, we considered questions such as these.  How might we use technical competition 
to spur innovation?  How can we create security architectures as part of the plan?  How do we 
advance the security engineering discipline to support what we need to do?  How do we define 
the problem to unravel the “mess?” 
 
The working groups were charged to develop their plans using a two-fold approach. First all 
members of the working groups were requested to come to the workshop with three bold moves. 
In the first break out session each working group enumerated these and then narrowed the list 
down to their top ten strategic moves. These moves were then used to develop an elucidated 
move plan which consisted of:  
 
• Move Description 
• Rationale 
• Execution  
• Time Frame  
• Barriers and Synergies 
• How the Move Contributes to the Vision  
 
In general, the first two days of the workshop were devoted to developing these move plans.  
Throughout this process the list of moves was refined and plenary sessions provided the 
opportunity to remove redundancies and or clarify differences. Several moves were 
recommended by multiple working groups, but on examination they had different foci.   
 
After the moves were developed and presented in joint sessions, the working groups began to 
describe the end states or what the envisioned results of these moves would be. This was 
generally developed in two parts, first a general description of an end state and then a vignette or 
visionette that would describe in an easily accessible style the objective to be achieved by the 
move plans.  
 
While this order (moves then vision) may be a bit unusual, most found it to be productive in this 
setting. Most, if not all participants arrived at the workshop with substantial experience in the 
area and with a set of pre-formed ideas about end states and where the nation should be. The 
majority of participants in the workshop had many (more than 20 years) of research, 
development, operation and management in the field. Given the degree of shared vision present, 
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we started by mapping out the concrete steps to achieve that vision and then went back and 
documented the vision.   
 
Initially working groups were assigned the designations, “Short Term”, Medium Term, and Long 
Term. Before the first break out working session, several participants objected to being 
constrained to a particular time frame and thus the groups were re-named A, B, and C. In 
actuality the groups did tend to produce results with a Short, Medium or Long orientation and the 
make up of the groups reflected those perspectives.  
2. Background: Creating a National Cyber Defense Initiative 
Late in 2006 a group of approximately 60 scientists convened in Albuquerque to discuss the 
overall cyber infrastructure.  The meeting was called the Safe Computing Workshop (SCW) 
Several findings emerged.  The first acknowledged the grim reality that the current state of 
affairs is unsustainable and exposes critical sectors to grave risk.  Adversaries will likely attempt 
to inflict strategic damage via an attack on multiple sectors. The second finding was optimistic: it 
is technically feasible to develop a coordinated national-level initiative with significant resources 
that can successfully address the problem.  
 
In early 2007, a small group of volunteers created a vision statement for a follow-on grass roots 
initiative called the National Cyber Defense Initiative (NCDI):  
 
"Over the next ten years, transform the cyber-infrastructure to be resistant to attack so that 
critical national interests are protected from catastrophic damage and our society can confidently 
adopt new technological advances."  
 
A number of other meetings took place during the ensuing months as described below.   
2.1. NCDI Key Contributors, Organizers and Catalyzers 
James Gosler, Sandia John Mallery, MIT CSAIL Adm. (ret.) Bill Studeman, 
DSB, NGC 
Cynthia Irvine, NPS Joe Markowitz, DSB Dick Schaeffer, NSA/IAD 
Keith Jarrin, NSA/NCSC Bridget Rogers, Sandia Shannon Spires, Sandia 
Carl Landwehr, 
DTO/IARPA 
O. Sami Saydjari, CDA Alan Wade, DSB 
Karl Levitt, NSF Don Simard, NSA/NCSC William Worley, Secure64 
2.2. NCDI-related Activities 
 DSB Net-centric Warfare Summer Study 
 April-August, 2006 
 http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2007-04-IM_Vol_I.pdf 
 SCW Planning Meeting (DTO, MIT, NSA, NSF, Sandia, UPenn) 
 August 21-22, 2006, MIT CSAIL, Cambridge 
 NSF-DTO-NSA Safe Computing Workshop  
 (60+ top US IA experts from government, industry and academia looked at entire 
computing & networking stack) 
   3 
 November 29 – December 1, 2006, Sandia National Laboratory, Albuquerque 
 https://og5.csail.mit.edu/scw/dist/ 
 NSF CyberTrust PI Meeting (NCDI presentations) 
 January 29-30, Atlanta 
 http://www.gtisc.gatech.edu/cybertrust2007/ 
 NSF-DTO-NSA Itanium STA Workshop (25 specialists examined Itanium as platform 
for STA and looked at programming language verification) 
 March 26-27 2006, MIT CSAIL, Cambridge 
 https://og5.csail.mit.edu/cdi/itanium/ 
 IA Leadership Workshop  
 (20 USG IA leaders reviewed NCDI progress to date) 
 June 13, 2007, NGC, Reston 
 https://og5.csail.mit.edu/cdi/ialw/ 
 Leap ahead Cyber Research offsite - August 30-31, Rosslyn, VA 
 DoD CIO brief Sept. 12, 2007, Pentagon 
 Workshop on Game-Changing Solutions for Cyber Security, Nov. 7, IARPA, College 
Park 
2.3. People at the Safe Computing Workshop 
People at the SCW came from a diversity of organizations listed below. 
 
Army Research Office Kestrel Institute Intel Corporation 
BBN LynuxWorks Sandia National 
Laboratories 
Boeing MIT  Secure64 Software  
Carnegie Mellon U. MITRE Corporation SRI International  
Cryptography and 
Information Systems Surety 
National Science Foundation Stanford University 
Cyber Defense Agency National Security Agency UC—Irvine 
Dartmouth College Naval Postgraduate School UC—Santa Barbara 
DePaul University Northeastern U. U. of New Mexico 
Disruptive Technology Office Northrop Grumman  U. of Penn. 
IBM  Oxford Systems U. of Texas – Austin 
Institute for Defense Analysis Princeton University Intel Corporation 
 
2.4. Findings from SCW 
 Attackers Rule, Disasters are Likely 
 Short-term Measures Essential but Insufficient 
 Market Forces Will Not Change the Balance 
 Usability & Manageability Critical to Solution 
 New Technology Can Catalyze Major Changes 
 Only a National Initiative Will Make a Real Difference 
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2.5. (Initial) SCW Vision for National Initiative 
 National Immunity from Cyber Attack 
 Economic Growth from Good Personal Privacy and Identity 
 Radically Reinvent Cyber Security Technology & Improve America’s Quality of Life 
2.6. SCW (intended) Next Steps 
 Carefully develop plan over next 7-12 months 
 Serve a Wide Range of Interests 
 More Robust Cyber Infrastructure 
 Lever to Enhance U. S. high-tech Competitiveness 
 Attract Top Students into Strong Educational Programs 
 Strengthen govt, industry, and academic research 
2.7. SCW Planning Phase 
 Plan Via Selected Small Focused Working Groups 
 Start with Four Working Groups 
 Program Group—Oversee and Spawn Groups 
 Vision Group—Create compelling vision 
 Threat Assessment Group—Case for Action 
 Architecture Group—Technical Approaches 
 Resources Needed 
 Multiple Sponsors to Ensure Broad Support 
 Profile: Eventually High Profile, but wait until have… 
 Vision, Plan, and Management Structure Worked Out 
2.8. NCDI Vision 
Vision:  Over the next ten years transform the cyber-infrastructure to be resistant to attack so that 
critical national interests are protected from catastrophic damage and our society can confidently 
adopt new technological advances. 
 
• Transformation means we must learn how to build the new infrastructure and deploy it 
•  Learning how to execute this transformation will advance both technology and U.S. 
competitiveness in many ways 
2.9. Elaborating the Vision 
 "transform the cyber-infrastructure" refers not only to changes in technology, but to all 
types of change necessary to affect adequate protection (including laws, education, 
societal norms, software, hardware, and so on).  
 "resistant to attack" does not mean "blocks all attacks" or "prevents all damage".   
 "critical national interests" does not limit the vision to affect only those things owned or 
controlled by the US Federal Government.   
 "protected from catastrophic damage" refers to situations which are so grave or so far 
reaching that a national response is required because the effects can't be remediated by 
individuals, communities, or corporations.  
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 "society can confidently adopt new technological advances" recognizes that an ability to 
rapidly adopt new technology is a vital aspect of national competitiveness. 
2.10. Prerequisites to Achieve the Vision 
 Ability to justifiably rely on our infrastructure 
 To know the risks and uncertainties 
 To know they are tolerably low 
 Ability to accept new technology quickly and safely 
 Design for evolution and verification 
 Streamline IA configuration, testing, evaluation 
 High system awareness & high software productivity 
 Ability to assure technological superiority 
 Integrate IA into the entire system development cycle 
 Provide incentives encourage and focus novel research 
 Provide incentives for industry to adapt 
2.11. NCDI Plan of Action 
 NCDI Scope 
 Networks, hosts, warning, response, supporting technologies 
 National effort from basic research to expedited delivery 
 Jump start (0-1 years) 
 Begin work on gating science & technology immediately 
 Three parallel thrusts: 
 Near term (1-3 years): Improvements 
 Shore up the existing infrastructure  
 Deliver proximate IA technologies for speedy deployment 
 Medium term (3-5 years): Reengineering 
 Deploy technologies based on best IA engineering practices 
 Develop several domain-specific demonstration systems 
 Long term (5-10 years): New platform and applications 
 Research foundational technologies  
 Create building blocks with agility in mind 
 Develop several priority applications based on new technology 
 Begin phased replacement of priority infrastructures 
 Start all three thrusts together after planning 
 Details need to be planned 
2.12. Need Solutions-Based Approach 
 Lessons of the past have made us cautious 
 Certain things didn’t work then 
 Physics is the same, but technology has changed 
 Will these differences permit us to revisit past solutions with a new twist? 
 Business models too often focus on near-term 
 May require ecosystem change  
 Must encompass existing systems (legacy) 
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2.13. Need Unorthodox Systems-Level Thinking 
 Problem is highly complex, yet … 
 Integrated benefit required (not just local maxima) 
 Optimization of solution to one aspect of problem can degrade the whole resulting 
in 
 Duplication 
 Excessive complexity 
 Inefficiencies 
 Contradictions 
 Need to create engineered building blocks designed to compose and be mutually 
supportive 
 Must find ways to achieve synergistic design 
 In the face of malicious intent 
 Consider radically different approaches 
 Example: non-von Neumann machines 
2.14. Teaching ourselves to build the infrastructure we want 
 Claim: we have component technologies, special approaches, but not economical, full-up 
system development strategies that predictably yield systems both resistant to attack and 
capable of easy incremental extension 
 Idea: Parallel system development competitions in different domains 
 Goal: system(s) with sound assurance argument, capable of extension 
 Domain examples: 
 Large scale IT infrastructure 
 Embedded control 
 Personal communication device 
 Election system 
 …. 
3. Process 
3.1. The charge 
Sami elucidated the workshop charge as follows. 
 




B. U.S. leadership is now worried. 
C. “Grassroots” movement…meet the cyber threat, yet guarantee civil liberties/Constitution. 
D. Short term (3-5 years)…means should be able to implement the plan/meet the short term 
goals in 3-5 years…starting year 0. 
E. Unconstrained – no constraints on $ and law. Think big. 
F. Everyone comes to the workshop with their “3 bold moves”, innumerate them 
immediately…then choose the group’s top 10 strategic moves. 
   7 
G. Think about the threat’s countermeasure to your proposed moves. 
3.2. Plan parameters 
Karl Levitt gave some of the parameters and requirements that a research plan would have to 
meet. 
A. Critical applications and infrastructures: 
1. power grid 
2. financial 
3. EMR and health 
4. e-voting 





C. Security shortfalls: 
1. security and privacy 
2. global identity management 
3. insider threats 
4. situation understanding 
5. operating while hurt 
6. information pedigree 
7. security metrics 
8. security and functionality (addition from audience) 
3.3. Structure and Definitions 
The workshop used the following concept structure framework.  The definitions provided below 
do not always have crisp boundaries between them and are working definitions that were refined 
during the course of the workshop. 
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Capabilities: A capability is some new ability to defend cyberspace from the perspective of a 
strategic decision maker.  It answers the question of how the cyber defense world would be 
different from an operational perspective.  Early Warning of strategic attack would be a 
capability. 
 
End-States: An end-state is the concept of operation providing context for a capability, again 
from the perspective of a strategic decision maker.  For example, if the nation has a capability to 
quickly recover its critical information infrastructure, then the end-state is that strategic attack 
damages are mitigated and critical services are restored quickly, possibly deterring adversaries 
from attempting the attack in the future. 
 
Vignettes:  A vignette is a story that illustrates and end-state in a way that non-technical people 
can understand. 
 
Investment Thrust: An investment thrust is a collection of moves (see below) toward some 
higher level goal such as a capability or an end-state.  Only group C used this intermediate 
abstraction. 
 
Moves: A move is a strategic action to mitigate a strategic risk in cyber defense and that 
contributes toward a higher-level goal such as a capability or end-state.  A move can contribute 




 End-States Vignettes 





Don Simard (NSA) Paul Sangster 
(Symantec) 











Bob Blakley (the 
Burton Group) 
Jim Gosler (Sandia) Mark Orwat  
(NPS)—scribe 
 
Group B  
Deb Cooper (consultant)—chair Doug Maughan (DHS) Clifff Wang (ARL) 
George Cox (Intel) Doug Maughan (DHS) Timothy Levin (NPS) 
Cynthia Irvine  (NPS) Jon Millen (MITRE) Bob Herd (BAH) 
Carl Landwehr (IARPA) Roger Schell (Aesec)  
 
Group C  
Terry V. Benzel 
(USC-ISI)—chair 
Ravi Iyer (UIUC) John Mallery (MIT) Bill Sanders (UIUC) 




Ken Shotting (NSA) 
Ted Huffmire 
(NPS)—scribe 
Karl Levitt (NSF) Peter Neumann 
(SRI) 
 
4. Stimulus Capabilities 
As a way to stimulate discussion on potential capabilities, a subgroup developed a set of 
strawman capabilities as described below.  Some of the moves in the section entitled “Moves—
Bottom Up” are mapped to these strawman capabilities. 
 
4.1. View Cyber Space 
o Sensor Grid. 
o We need to be able to see all of the strategic attack space. 
o Cyber Indications and Warning. 
o We need to know well in advance of the damaging effects of a strategic cyber 
attack. 
o Cyber Intelligence System. 
o We need to know capabilities, intentions and plans of potential adversaries. 
 
4.2. Response 1 
o Strategy and Tactics. 
o Develop strategy and tactics to handle attacks in real-time when they occur. 
o Autonomic Response. 
o Have some autonomic response to minimize damage and buy time without giving 
the adversary a control surface that he can manipulate against us. 
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o Create trustworthy “AI” to support decisions 
o Cyber Weapons Dynamic Countermeasure 
o Quickly detect new malware and auto-gen counters 
 
4.3. Response 2 
o Response Infrastructure. 
o Create controls within systems to change configurations on-the-fly to effectively 
thwart attack (according to some worked-out strategy and tactic set). 
o Cyber Offense 
o Create weapons and tactics to allow us to strategically damage adversaries either 
preemptively or in retaliation 




o Rapid Recovery. 
o Recover from a strategically damaging attack quickly 
o Ensure minimal functionality survives while attacks are being waged against the system. 
o Maintain minimal functionality if a catastrophic event occurs.(identify what it is and 
ensure we can "reboot" infrastructure to maintain financial, power, telecom.) 
 
4.5. Architecture 
o Separate control/management plane from the operational plane. 
o Retrofit Internet Infrastructure for High Integrity Authentication 
o Usability 
o Make it easy for ordinary users to maintain the security of their systems and to 
interact securely with others. 
4.6. Trust, Engineering & Science 
o Trustworthy Computing Base. 
o Create technology, process, and policy to establish a trustworthy base for critical. 
 Info. Infrastructure. 
o Secure System Engineering Discipline. 
o Create metrics, principles, risk calculus, design patterns, and a means to learn 
from our mistakes. 
o Sustaining Cyber Defense Science. 
o Invest in people and communities of researchers to create and sustain a basis of 
innovative groups working in this area. 
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5. Moves—Bottom-up 
The first task assigned to the groups was to develop opening move plans.  This section captures 
the moves as they were developed during the first two days of the workshop. Several moves 
were suggested by more than one working group, but on examination they had different foci.   
5.1. Group A 
Group A was originally focused on short term moves this, however, was not adhered to and the 
group focused on moves they found necessary to protect the nation’s critical infrastructure 
regardless of the time-frame.  The group worked as a whole and did not divide into sub-groups.  
This allowed us to incorporate the different perspectives each member brought into a move. 
   
The following list is the original set of top moves with timeframe indicated in parentheses (ST is 
short term, MT is medium term, and LT is long-term). 
1. Local administration (counter the remote provisioning problem) (ST) 
2. Special purpose security devices (MT) 
3. System liability / warranted merchantability (LT) 
4. Establish a national scale federated test bed (ST) 
5. Diversity of security controls (heterogeneity)…reversing the trend 
6. Deploy network admission control (eliminate unauthorized connections) (MT) 
7. SCADA as exemplar (MT) 
8. Stratifying architecture (get rid of in-band signaling, the Von Neumann architecture) (MT) 
9. Supply chain problems (lifecycle attacks) (LT) 
10. Determining value / cyber threat assessment (ST) 
11. Critical alert infrastructure and early warning / cyber intelligence system (S/MT) 
12. Strong identity management / attribution (LT) 
 
This list was further refined.  The group captured the general discussion, problem it was intended 
to solve, rationale of why we thought it would solve the problem, how it would be executed, the 
timeframe, resources, and barriers and why it was new.  
5.1.1. Local administration (counter the remote provisioning problem) 
General Discussion: Some infrastructure components are too critical to exist on the grid 
together. “One size does not fit all.” Apply risk assessment to architectural design. The 
architecture / policy should not preclude a local administrator from being the final authority of 
his infrastructure piece. We must be able to trade off Confidentiality-Integrty-Availability (C-I-
A) in the risk management. Even though units are not consistent, “adding a pound of 
confidentiality takes away three pounds of availability.”    
Problem: For critical systems, the current risk is unbalanced between: remote administration 
(provides attack vectors for the adversary) and its economic and efficiency benefits...and 
security. 
Two moves: informed risk management, layout a series of architectural principles to support 
design systems that can be secured.  
Rationale: Will require proximal access to the system, thus giving increased risk to the 
adversary. Centrally-managed mistakes are global, local mistakes may or may not be contained. 
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Execution: Manpower and training changes, identify the critical components and functions that 
should be remotely managed versus locally managed. Avoid precluding local monitoring and 
management.  
Time Frame: short-term. 
Barriers/Synergy: reduces efficiencies, more costly, more administrating personnel required  
Resources: 100s of millions 
New: Reversing a trend or tendency towards remote provisioning. 
Category: Engineer Recovery, Architecture, Response #21 
5.1.2. Special purpose security devices to include composability 
General Discussion: This is an example of architectural principles. Eliminate unneeded 
functionality. This is a move to choose simplicity. Reduce the trend towards using multi-purpose, 
general devices for everything. Excess functionality is not free from a security perspective. 
Problem: General purpose devices provide more functionality than required, introducing 
vulnerabilities which give the adversary more attack vectors. Device solutions as well as 
interconnection procedures / rules are both important. 
Move: Develop the family of devices and the interconnection functions that allow you to 
assemble a system with only the needed capability. Further, build up a better inventory of 
specialized devices (“a parts catalogue”) versus putting all the money into general, multi-purpose 
devices. 
Rationale: Economic efficiency of general purpose devices (economies of scale in 
manufacturing and fewer people required to understand and administer the fewer devices). Also, 
a technical barrier exists. 
Execution: removing technicalities.  
Time Frame: Medium-term. 
Barriers/Synergy: development, lifecycle support (more things to support and more difficult to 
support)...can’t just distribute a CD-rom.  
Resources: Incentive to encourage vendors to go back to developing specialized devices. 100s of 
millions. 
Category: Architecture, Trust Engineering and Science 
5.1.3. Vendor responsiveness to security concerns 
General Discussion: Major software vendors have warranties that deflects blame. If you follow 
a government spec in the product, the government assumes some responsibility. “Contingent 
liabilities”…depends on regulation or litigation. Warranty merchantability…the product will do 
these specific things. Software does not have consumer product registration. But, what is the 
impact on open source products? How do you find the culpable party? Is this a vendor or a 
consumer problem? 
Problem: Currently, vendors create insecure products due to economic incentives and other 
pressures yet do not have to bear the cost of failure.  
Move: alter the conditions of the market to value security over some functionality (to alter the 
investments so we get a higher baseline). Encourage industry certifications, expose liability 
problems, legislation.      
Rationale: Vendors are currently not incentivized to be part of the solution. 
                                                
1 See section entitled “Stimulus Capabilities” for categories. 
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Execution: Engage the vendor community to self-regulate or otherwise propose measures (e.g., 
consumer education, tax incentives, limited product liability, warranted merchantability, etc.) 
that accomplish both business and public welfare goals. 
Time Frame: long-term 
Barriers/Synergy: Anti-trust issues, free market capitalism (laissez-faire), uninformed 
consumers, un-incentivized vendors  
Resources: various ways of paying for public welfare benefits 
New: new application of an old remedy 
Category: Trust Engineering and Science 
5.1.4. Establish a national scale federated test bed 
General Discussion: consider this a validation capability…a “cyber Nellis.” Add an active 
adversary to the test bed, including the adversary’s tactics and products obtained surreptitiously. 
Develop the models that you’re trying to secure that are potentially too dangerous to deploy, and 
validate approaches. The test bed can assist in finding zero day exploits. 
Problem: when we install a component into an infrastructure we don’t know the risk introduced. 
We don’t know good practice. Testing in an adversarial environment. 
Move: provide a spectrum of test beds for validation of functionality, interoperability, and 
security; training and evaluation of products and people; and design.  
Alternative move: the training, evaluation, and certification of mission and life critical IT jobs. 
Rationale: gap between research and deployment, allows for partnerships and proofs of concept, 
allow an improvement of modeling of complex systems. Can study cascading effects. 
Execution: Building an interconnected set of test beds, may be some islands of test beds (e.g., a 
classified bed), test beds will have to be fully instrumented. An aggressive red team capability. 
Could be international.   
Time Frame: short-term. 
Barriers/Synergy: protection of intellectual property, containment, governance 
Resources: 100s of millions, but can have cost recovery (people have to use the test beds, forced 
to pay). 
New: scale, adversary, competition and industry participation, independent evaluation  
Category: Trust Engineering and Science, Architecture, Sustained Cyber Defense Science, 
Engineering Recovery 
5.1.5. Diversity of security controls (heterogeneity)…reversing the trend 
General Discussion: Diversity in layers (depth) is good, but avoid giving a lot of diversity in a 
single layer. Encourage diversity. If security mechanisms are dictated as the same across 
systems, adversaries can focus effort against the single security mechanism. Diversity makes it 
more difficult to produce the exploit. Raise the effort level, make it more visible during exploit 
development. Patch management may be called a step towards monoculture (making all the 
machines the same). 
Move: government addresses common mode failures by diversification, be aware of tendencies 
to monoculture, facilitate diverse security product development (e.g., move away from a von 
Neumann architecture). 
Rationale: Economic efficiency of general purpose devices (economies of scale in 
manufacturing and fewer people required to understand and administer the fewer devices). Also, 
a technical barrier exists. 
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Execution: removing technicalities.  
Time Frame: Medium-term. 
Barriers/Synergy: development, lifecycle support (more things to support and more difficult to 
support)...can’t just distribute a CD-rom.  
Resources: Incentive to encourage vendors to go back to developing specialized devices. 100s of 
millions 
Category: Trust Engineering and Science, Architecture  
5.1.6. Deploy network admission control (eliminate unauthorized 
connections) 
General Discussion: Cisco’s Network Admission Control (NAC) (for example)…assess the 
system requesting access (interrogate). Accept, deny, or remediate prior to access. Remediate: if 
there is a problem, send the device to quarantine to run anti-virus, etc. The issue here is dynamic 
root of trust. NAC enables you to ensure a certain integrity-level for devices. Automated 
checking of the baseline for security. 
Problem: We have rogue/poorly configured machines that introduce vulnerabilities into a 
network when they access the network, impacting the entire network.    
Move: establish a standard requiring all critical systems to check devices requesting access in 
order to provide a baseline for system integrity. 
Rationale: gives the network the ability to attest that a device is not configured to introduce 
problems…also, can remediate. (Separate the remediation?)  
Execution: Government: formulation of a NIST/FIPS standard, and an executive policy order 
saying to do this for critical infrastructure. Private: a regulation (similar to HIPPA)    
Time Frame: Medium-term. 
Barriers/Synergy: commercial competitiveness 
Resources: 100s of millions. 
Category: Response #1, Response #2, View Cyberspace, Trust Engineering and Science, 
Architecture 
5.1.7. SCADA as exemplar 
Problem: This is really an opportunity, not a problem.   
Move: Help SCADA companies harden their systems, prepare for their use for experimentation. 
Possibly increase funding as an incentive. 
Rationale: SCADA systems closely regulated industry, still have stratified networks, needs 
limited functionality (use specialized devices), limited subscribers, can apply to other domains. 
Execution: Create a large SCADA program immediately. Government must make incentives 
available.  
Time Frame: medium-term. 
Barriers/Synergy: proprietary disincentive, the initial rollout, physical insecurity.  
Resources: 100s of millions 
Category: N/A 
5.1.8. Stratifying architecture 
Problem: Adversaries have direct access to critical infrastructure components without having to 
bear risk.  
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Move: at a policy level, prefer stratified design in security critical components. Re-stratify those 
networks that have moved away from this concept. Take security critical access stuff off-line 
(separate networks). Go to out of band signaling, get out of Von-Neumann architectures. 
Rationale: Raises the risk factor for an adversary. Low risk introduced. Impose cost and risk. 
Create gaps a cascading failure can’t cross. 
Execution: Establish a control plane, separate from the subscriber plane…and critical from non-
critical. One separates the outsider, one the insider. The execution must overcome the barriers 
listed below.  
Time Frame: medium-term. 
Barriers/Synergy: Cost, convenience, expertise required to implement design, synchronization 
of data and functionality across strata, preventing covert signaling, detecting malware. 
Resources: 100s of millions, can be incremental. 
Category: Architecture, Engineering Recovery 
Investment Thrust: A lot of this is operational rather than research 
What’s New: Many critical networks are becoming less stratified.  This move reverses the trend. 
5.1.9. Lifecycle attacks. 
General Discussion:  Design with trusted people, make what you designed, lifecycle trust (not 
modified from its secure state). “Trusted distribution.” 
Problem: An adversary can influence/alter components of a critical system in the supply chain. 
Inherent versus operationally induced vulnerabilities. 
Move: Design with trusted people using sound security practices. 
Rationale: We have to have the capability to  raise the level of work and risk associated with an 
adversary introducing malware. 
Execution: Raise awareness, publicize examples, international action (e.g., trade sanctions, etc.), 
maintenance portion of lifecycle.  
Time Frame: long-term. 
Barriers/Synergy: hard problem 
Resources: 100s of millions 
Category: Trust Engineering and Science, Cyber Intelligence Systems  
5.1.10. Determining the impact of attacks and outages  
General Discussion:  Enabling informed risk management. 
Problem: We do not know the worth of a capability (e.g., the cost of alternate courses of action) 
that may be denied by a cyber attack…we can’t do risk management / cost benefit analysis 
without the value proposition.   
Move: Determine the impact of attacks and outages to critical infrastructure / determining cyber 
threat assessment. Deny cyber capabilities in exercises and investigate the resulting impact. 
Rationale:  Intelligent risk management requires to weigh costs and benefits.  To do that, one 
needs to understand the value of capabilities. 
Execution: Use exercises as an opportunity to refine the value proposition by allowing cyber 
mischief. Script results of exercises into subsequent exercises. 
Time Frame: short-term. 
Barriers/Synergy: cost, potential loss of confidence in systems  
Resources: 100s of millions 
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Category: Cyber Intelligence System, Recovery, Training Impact, View Cyberspace, Trust 
Engineering and Science  
5.1.11. Strategic warning, integrated attack-sensing, and alerting. 
General Discussion: (Previous title: critical alert infrastructure and early warning / cyber 
intelligence system). Alert the defender. Cyber Norad. “Integrated sensing and warning.” 
“Receptors and effectors.” 
Problem: Currently we have no way of knowing before a strategic attack happens (learning), 
once we learn of an incoming attack, we have no way of communicating the threat to other parts 
of the critical infrastructure to avoid catastrophic damages.  
Move: create a sensing and an alert system for the critical infrastructure, tasking intelligence 
assets to scout adversary actions and intentions. Increase citizen awareness of the problem. 
Rationale: For damage mitigation…gives us a longer time to react, increases our confidence. 
Push the boundary of risk out...to include intelligence from within the adversary’s Area of 
Responsibility (AOR). To reduce latency in reaction, “expand the playbook”. 
Execution: More and various sensors integrated into the warning system to prevent errors (Type 
1 and 2). Identify an aggressive consumer of the alert information that will motivate intelligence 
assets. Implement a citizen’s “whistle-blower” capability in the alert system. Industry integration 
such as ISPs, existing and opportunistic sensor networks (e.g., Google, gaming companies, 3rd 
Brigade). Establish a coordinated center of sensor operations. “Emergency broadcast system” for 
cyber system attacks (including out-of-band). 
Time Frame: short-term/medium term. 
Barriers/Synergy: Technologies for data reduction, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), etc. 
Resources: 100s of millions 
New: Intro of cyber alert into other components of critical infrastructure (e.g., power), defining 
the role of the citizenry within the cyber alert system. 
Category: Autonomic Response, Recovery, View Cyberspace    
5.1.12. Strong human identity management / attribution…people 
Problem: We want to eliminate the ability of people to damage critical infrastructure without 
attribution. Will become a deterrence. Can’t hold individuals responsible for actions. Create risk 
for people doing these things.    
Move: create the capability for identity management for critical infrastructure.  
Rationale: Identifying people allows us to infuse accountability and deterrence. 
Execution: FIPS standards and mandatory access controls based on those. Outlaw passwords. 
Time Frame: long-term (to scale to entire population) 
Barriers/Synergy: privacy concerns, is the internet a right or a privilege? 
Resources: 100s of millions 
New: help support attribution 
Category: View Cyberspace, Trust Engineering and Science 
5.1.13. Strong machine identity management…computer to computer 
Problem: We want to eliminate the ability of computers to damage critical infrastructure without 
attribution. Create risk for people doing these things.    
Move: create the capability for identity management for critical infrastructure.  
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Rationale: To enable accurate forensics (trace-back). Network admission will depend on it. We 
added risk to the adversary. 
Execution: FIPS standards and mandatory access controls based on those. 
Time Frame: long-term 
Barriers/Synergy: privacy, ecosystem does not exist (name space admin, etc.). 
Resources: 100s of millions 
Category: View Cyberspace, Trust Engineering and Science 
5.1.14. (New) Develop national continuity plan for critical cyber 
infrastructure 
Problem:  National leadership likely does not know how to reconstitute critical information 
infrastructure if it is entirely lost. 
Move:  Develop a plan for continuity of operations for the critical information infrastructure. 
Rationale:  Without a plan, reconstitution of service could take substantially longer than needed, 
multiplying the damages significantly. 
Execution: Exercise plan in test bed environment 
Time Frame: long-term 
Barriers/Synergy: The analysis effort will be significant and could require significant 
investnemnt to counter the continuity issues. 
Resources: 100s of millions 
Category: Recovery 
5.1.15.  (New) Create of a critical infrastructure boot sequence 
Problem: We do not have knowledge of the minimum functionality nor a restoration point for 
all the sectors within the critical infrastructure under ongoing attack. 
Move: Create a boot sequence for the minimum functionality of our critical infrastructure. Task 
(FEMA?) with the creation, maintenance, and testing of the plan to reconstitute the critical 
infrastructure.  
Rationale:  
Execution: Restoration of minimum service to include order wire2. Conduct on a per-sector 
basis. Go to each sector and evaluate/update their plans. 
Time Frame: long-term 
Barriers/Synergy:  
Resources: 100s of millions 
Category: Recovery 
5.2. Group B 
Group B was assigned to focus on the mid-term (5 to 10 years out), with the allowance from the 
steering group that input regarding short and long term solutions would be welcome, as well.  
 
The group worked as a whole and did not divide into sub-groups.  It started off by brainstorming 
about potential moves, which means that a broad spectrum of ideas was discussed without too 
much critical assessment.  Then, the potential moves were pruned into a list that the group agreed 
                                                
2 The intent of the phrase “order wire” is unclear from original notes.  We think it means the 
order in refers to the order in which the system must be restored. 
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to take forward. Each move was assigned to a participant to describe in prose and power-point, 
who was (in general) the originator of the idea. 
The following list is the original set of ten moves.  
 Internet Caller-ID—Aka “Accountable Internet”  
 Autonomic Configuration Mgmt  
 Standardized USG Configuration Management  
 Exploitation  
 Privacy of network data  
 National Competitions in Secure System Development  
 Trusted Distribution Authority for High-assurance  
 Network Testbed for High-assurance Precision Composition  
 Authentication Based on Distributed Dynamic Labels  
 Privacy Issues 
 Research support for cyber defense science  
The moves were further refined in general discussion, in terms of the problem it was intended to 
solve, rationale of why we thought it would solve the problem, how it would be executed, the 
timeframe, resources, barriers and why it was new. 
 
The following general observations were made by the group as context. 
 
1. What do we mean by security (scope, etc.)…people must agree on the nature of the problem. 
2. Every system doesn’t require all the security incorporated into it (may change with respect to a 
mission, set of threats, etc.). 
3. Test beds for experimentation and sensitivity analysis. 
4. Authentication…who is on the other end of the wire? Technology and liability (e.g., liability 
at the Certificant Authority (CA) level for misrepresenting an individual). 
5. Attestation (checking configuration and state). 
6. Reconstitution back to a prior secure state. 
7. Software engineering issues in general (education, policy, liability, etc.) 
8. Privacy in a cyber world. Unsettled legal issues (e.g.:  Both parties consent). Settle on a 
solution and live with the consequences. 
9. Platform issues: multi-cores, quiet processors, interconnect component security. Processors 
that are aware of their environment (cameras, biometrics, etc.)…and react accordingly. 
10. Competitions are good, but scope is difficult…will they stretch the state of practice? 
11. Redundancy in infrastructure. More robust but less capable…yet you need robustness the 
most during emergencies. Business is tending towards eliminating redundancies. 
5.2.1. Internet Caller-ID—Aka “Accountable Internet” 
Problem: Lack of high-integrity authentication 
Move: Non-spoofable Internet caller ID  
Rationale: Will improve privacy, authenticity, confidentiality, and integrity 
Barriers: May require high-integrity, out-of-band mechanisms; significant challenges to satisfy 
privacy concerns; policies for opt-in and opt-out;  
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Synergies: testbed and contest; desire for identity management 
Execution: R&D on high-integrity, non-spoofable end-to-end solution incorporating HW & SW; 
may need to be out of band; international standards; social studies and solutions for privacy 
Timeframe and Cost: standards (near); prototype implementation in testbed (near); commercial 
(mid) 
5.2.2. Autonomic Configuration Mgmt 
Problem –  Guarantees of attribution and integrity of platform configurations not currently 
practical 
Solution/Move: Autonomous, platform level, initial and subsequent platform provisioning, 
logging, (re)measurement, attested reporting, and response 
Rationale – comprehensive “cradle to grave” model 
Execution – Guarantee attribution and integrity of ALL executable elements on a platform via 
–Supply chain changes to guarantee policy driven controls at every stage of through creation, 
aggregation, distribution, deployment, provisioning, loading, and execution controls 
–Provisioning, load, and execute enforcement and upstream attestation/reporting via embedded, 
robust, platform services 
Barriers and Synergies 
–Willingness to do and stand behind digital signatures => liability considerations 
–Getting signed representations of executable elements and policies used across the supply 
chain 
–Deploying a “safe place” for platform services to stand 
Timeframe and Costs:  Within 5 years. Costs mostly in supply chain and in online 
“canonically-OK”3 configurations services 
5.2.3. Standardized United States Government Configuration Management 
Solution/Move: Establish an authoritative enforcement organization within the US government 
(USG) to ensure all USG systems/networks meet a minimum configuration baseline 
(incorporating industry best practices) 
Rationale: Current USG operations (e.g., Federal Information System Management Act 
(FISMA)) have no enforcement mechanism 
Execution: The President of the United States should establish this entity under White House 
auspices, coordinating with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to impact budgets of 
non-conforming agencies. Enforcement organization cannot be part of an existing entity and 
should be something like the Government Accountability Office (GAO). 
Barriers/Synergies: (1) Conflicting authorities between Intelliegnce Community (IC) / 
Department of Defense (DOD) / Civilian USG, (2) Reluctance of agencies to comply, (3) 
Agreement on “single acceptable” configuration (does this produce an even worse monoculture?) 
Timeframe / Costs: 3-4 years / $100M above existing operational agency costs 
                                                
3 A "guarantee" can be provided that a given platform is in one of the OK configurations through a combination of: (1) Supply (i.e., lifecycle) 
chain control to ensure that  (Distributed elements are OK ; Only OK elements are present in a configuration) and  (2) A combination of platform 
and online services to determine the exact configuration of a platform at the time of attestation, which comprises the exact version of each 
configuration element. The list of OK configurations is determined by some sort of testing and evaluation. Simply determining that a platform has 
only OK elements is only half the job; the other half is tackling the combinatorial nightmare of maintaining a list of OK configurations that is full 
enough to be useful, and yet the testing and evaluation of each configuration includes the cross-product of the effects of the exact version of all 
configuration elements.   
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5.2.4. Exploitation 
Problem: Waiting for the cyber levees to break 
Move (Solution): National directive for security assessment of all cyber-based public 
infrastructure systems  
Rationale for Solution: We don’t know what we don’t know 
Synergies & Barriers:  
Execution: Federal, State, Local 
Timeframe: Start immediately  
Cost: 
5.2.5. Privacy of network data 
Problem: Privacy law with respect to network data capture and use is legally unsettled. 
Solution: Study group to study problem from policy, technical, and legal aspects.  proposals for 
model legislation, regulations. 
Rationale: Uniformity reduces risk, allows development of technology within a uniform 
framework. 
Execution: Effort to take place in open discussion with maximum transparency.  
Time and costs: 2-3 years study, 2-3 more for legislation.  Overall cost in low millions??? 
5.2.6. National Competitions in Secure System Development 
Move: Create national competitions in secure system development to advance technology, focus 
energy, and train a new generation of experts in the relevant technologies.  
Problems:  a. lack of demonstrated system engineering technologies for cost-effective design, 
development, and implementation of systems with sound assurance arguments capable of 
resisting cyber attack and also able to absorb new technology without compromising the 
assurance argument. b. lack of personnel educated and trained in essential technologies.  c. lack 
of coordination among government, industry, and academic efforts 
Rationale: Advance technology, create excitement, focus academia, industry, government on 
significant technical goals, enhance national competitiveness in critical technology domains 
Barriers and Synergies: Barriers: difficulty of framing the competitions, commercial 
sensitivities may be an issue.  Synergies Near-term demonstration with component technologies 
for system security design, development, and implementation. Also synergistic with testbed 
development efforts. 
Execution: 
1. Select several domains for parallel system development.  
2. Set the parameters for the competition, using experts from academia, industry, and 
government 
3. Circulate the proposed competition structure publicly and invite comment.  
4. Release the official competition documents and accept proposals. 
5. Evaluate proposals and make awards. 
6. Monitor the developments.  
7. Evaluate the delivered systems according to the plan developed and determine awards. 
Time and Resources: 5 years, $50M/year/domain 
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5.2.7. Trusted Distribution Authority for High-assurance 
Problem: Attackers subvert the very technologies we develop for cyber security by planting 
artifices in hardware, tools, platforms, or software during their extended lifecycles.  In addition 
we lack adequate software development tools for developers to build actually-secure software 
that can be evaluated at high-assurance to verify that it isn’t riddled with flaws and planted 
artifices during development. 
Move: Create and operate a trusted distribution authority for both commercial and government 
items critical to high-assurance security.  Develop and make available a comprehensive tool kit 
of all the major tools necessary to support development and high-assurance evaluation of 
actually-secure software systems. 
Rationale: DoD, IC, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Energy (DOE), 
or enterprises need to integrate the Internet and other networks in real time and rely on cyber 
security.  Provide government and commercial developers of software technology for cyber 
security support for high-assurance Cross Domain (CD) solutions, e.g., those on Research and 
Development (R&D) List of Unified Cross Domain Management Office (UCDMO) 
Execution: The trusted distribution authority will address both deployable components as well as 
the tool for development of high-assurance solutions. 
Deployable Components.  The trusted distribution authority will (1) certify a government 
foundry(s) for broadly usable critical security hardware components (e.g. Intel x.86-based chips); 
(2) distribute critical security operational software components (e.g. OS kernels); (3) distribute 
software development tools (e.g., compilers, etc.); (4) sanction, provide the required resources 
and openly publish results of high-assurance evaluations at no cost to the developers of actually-
secure software components; and (4) supply trusted distribution for all this. The security 
evaluations will verify system protections against subversion under widely available criteria for 
both individual components and demonstrably sound architectures for composition, leveraging 
applicable prior evaluations, and the objective third-party evaluators who conduct the evaluations 
will waive proprietary rights in the results. The trusted distribution will physically and logically 
validate (e.g., using digital signing) high-assurance against subversion over product lifecycle. 
Tools for Trusted Software.  Make trusted software development tools inspectable for security-
supporting properties, inter-aware for efficiency, and extensible to existing, augmented, and 
emerging Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) products. At a minimum, include in this tool kit 
the following: (1) formal specification and verification tools enabled for flow analysis; (2) 
compilers and linkers supporting programming models for hardware segmentation; (3) strongly 
typed source language tools with efficient direct compilation suitable for operating system 
kernels; (4) inspectable configuration management and source control; (5) tools for annotation 
and checking of source code correspondence to formal specification; and (6) test-case generation 
and coverage assessment tools. 
Barriers & synergies: A barrier is Trusted Computer Security Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) 
phobia and opposition from band-aide vendors that have a $20 billion market put at risk. 
This is synergistic with several other proposed moves including (1) results from National 
Competitions in Secure System Development, (2) Autonomic Configuration Management, and 
(3) Standardized USG Configuration Management. 
Timeframes & costs: 5-8 years and $40-60m per year. 
What’s new:  Providing lifecycle authenticity for security critical components changes the rules.   
This starts with building these components properly from the start by knowing your hardware 
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and software.  This trusted distribution authority can be quickly deployed initially using available 
high-assurance Trusted Computing Base (TCB) technology and is highly scalable. 
How does this defeat adversary 
The core of the threat model is subversion, exemplified by a “2-card loader” bootstrap4 artifice in 
the base operating system and hardware platform.  This is building the critical infrastructure right 
with actually-secure (e.g., meeting Class A1 requirements) componenets at critical nodes in 
order to thwart catastrophic attack on the cyber portion of the national critical infrastructure.  To 
successfully attack with this move in place the adversary has to have penetrated the foundry for 
security-critical hardware, the high-assurance TCB in the deployable components, and the high-
assurance evaluation and trusted distribution.  Each of these dramatically increases his cost in 
comparison to the current cyber infrastructure. 
5.2.8. Network Testbed for High-assurance Precision Composition 
Problem: Attackers will subvert the very technologies developed for cyber security to exploit 
false confidence in deficiently composed networks by planting artifices in the system and 
application controls of untrustworthy components at security-critical nodes.  Attackers will 
contest and degrade any low-integrity network upon which DoD operations depend (e.g. the 
Internet); and successful attackers will essentially “own” that network at the time of their 
choosing. 
Move: Demonstrate the capabilities and limitations of the two proven and powerful composition 
tools for security engineering that Computer Science has today – “partitioned TCBs” and “TCB 
Subsets” – to compose with precision high-assurance secure network-centric environments 
ranging from single enterprise installations to the Global Information Grid (GIG) by leveraging 
actually-secure components at select nodes.  The testbed will yield an actionable roadmap for a 
series of testbed configurations – from proof of concept, to technology demonstration, to pilot.  
Rationale: DoD, IC, DHS, DOE, or enterprise that needs to integrate networks in real time and 
prevent grave damage by determined attacker. 
Execution: The initial testbed is a fully MultiLevel Secure (MLS) (but functionally constrained) 
network using mature and previously evaluated high-assurance COTS technology.  The 
continued operation and assessment of this testbed provides a baseline for identifying technology 
gaps and integration of additional solutions as they emerge from other projects.  The following 
are specific capabilities that are included in the testbed. 
Distributed Information Access.  The initial configuration will compose MLS thin clients and 
MLS file/storage severs with less trusted commercial Information Technology (IT) components.  
This will demonstrate that an operationally useful and actually-secure MLS network can be 
fielded using proven COTS secure MLS technology in as little as two years. 
High-integrity Domain(s) for Critical Operations.  First testbed domain: actual NIPRNET 
used to conduct critical DoD operations, then distinguish and expand to additional domains.  
Create and protect a number of high-integrity domains for critical operations, starting with a 
testbed pilot and evolving into the operational GIG. High-assurance systems and procedural 
security will validate that low-integrity code and data cannot enter a policy-defined explicitly 
labeled (partially ordered) higher integrity operational domain except through well defined 
interfaces (not firewalls or virus scanners, most of which will no longer be needed within the 
                                                
4 the attacker plants a software bootstrap artifice during the lifecycle and at the time of attack 
triggers it to read in a malicious program as data and transfer control to the attack program. 
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higher integrity domains). Initially this may inconvenience users who wish to seamlessly surf the 
web, chat, and email from the very same systems intended to protect the nation, but over time, 
aggressive research and development (e.g., high-assurance MLS video) and the evolution of 
procedures will inevitably reduce inconveniences and functional limitations.   
Extensions Beyond Early Configurations.  Extend the testbed capabilities to other high-
assurance capabilities based on proven high-assurance technology such as a secure Basic Input 
Output System (BIOS) standard, MLS Real Time Operating System (RTOS) for Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition/SCADA/ Industrial Control (ICS), MLS Virtual Private Networks 
(VPNs) (e.g., enhanced Blacker), actually-secure Linux/Unix, and secure virtualization.  These 
will be introduced in logical order given interrelationships among components, and with an 
emphasis on leveraging and enhancing COTS products to encourage their widespread 
availability and support. 
Barriers & synergies:  Users can’t surf, chat, and email in an unconstrained way to and from 
high-integrity and confidentiality systems.  An additional barrier is TCSEC phobia and 
opposition from band-aide vendors that have a $20 billion market put at risk. This synergistic 
with other proposed moves including (1) results from National Competitions in Secure System 
Development, and (2) Trusted Distribution Authority for High-assurance which will distribute 
the components to the testbed. 
Timeframes & costs: 3-5 years and $60-100m per year. 
What’s new: Demonstrating how the already-available high-assurance (e.g., meeting the Class 
A1 technical requirements) technology can be integrated with other low assurance functionality 
to dramatically improve the ability the cyber portion of the national critical infrastructure to 
enforce mandatory access control (MAC) for both confidentiality and integrity.  The basic 
paradigm is that rather than trying to add security to rich functionality, functionality is added 
over time to strong security from the outset.  This starts with only relying on components for 
MLS enforcement that are built properly from the start to be high-assurance.  This move is 
focused on exploiting what can be quickly deployed initially using available high-assurance TCB 
technology and is highly scalable.  This provides a “baseline” of the capability to resist high-
intensity attack, and thus serves to identify and validate technology gaps that require additional 
R&D.  As R&D results emerge, these are added to the testbed to update this baseline.   
How does this defeat adversary: The core of the threat model is subversion, exemplified by a 
“2-card loader” bootstrap artifice5 in the base operating system and hardware platform.  This 
network testbed validates techniques for building the critical infrastructure right with actually-
secure (e.g., meeting Class A1 requirements) components at critical nodes in order to thwart 
catastrophic attack on the cyber portion of the national critical infrastructure.  To successfully 
attack a critical infrastructure based on the composition validated in this testbed the adversary 
has to have penetrated the high-assurance TCB in the deployable components.  This dramatically 
increases his cost in comparison to the current cyber infrastructure. 
5.2.9. Privacy Issues 
Problem: Issues of privacy are (hopelessly?) intertwined with the need to obtain information for 
network management, provisioning, research and security purposes. The question of who can 
collect data, what kinds of data can be collected, the uses to which it can be put and who can 
                                                
5 the attacker plants a software bootstrap artifice during the lifecycle and at the time of attack 
triggers it to read in a malicious program as data and transfer control to the attack program. 
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access it are governed by a variety of international, national, and local laws as well as by 
contractual and other considerations. The current legal climate often discourages the kinds of 
monitoring and data collection that is necessary for situational awareness. A uniform set of 
policies and regulations, at least within the U.S., would give certainty where none exists now. 
Move: Form a joint task force with experts from the technical, legal, privacy, operational and 
other stakeholder communities to study this area and to draft model legislation and regulations.  
Part of the charge needs to be the construction of arguments that manage the expectations of the 
stakeholders, including the individual end users.  Analogies between addressing presence on the 
information highway and observable physical presence on the physical highway may or may not 
be fruitful. Publicizing the widespread presence of spyware, etc. may help to bring home the lack 
of real privacy in many (most) systems. 
Rationale: The unsettled nature of the law and the widespread distribution of superficial 
analyses serve to increase uncertainty and anxiety.  Uniformity, even if it is more constraining 
than some of the existing practices, removes an area of uncertainty. This can be a risk-mitigating 
factor as it can deflect potential liability.  Once the ground rules are clear, technology can be 
developed to maximize the utility of the information acquired, within the framework of the 
regulations. 
Barriers / Synergies: Legislative action will be required in most cases.  The model legislation 
route has been successful in the past for similar situations.  Considerable public discussion and 
debate will be required. 
Execution: Formation of the task force needs maximal stakeholder participation. Staff to 
perform legal and other research will be needed.  The topic will require time to develop 
consensus. 
What is new: Research in social engineering, i.e. creation of a culture and mindset supported by 
laws and regulation appears to be a novel approach for both the Computer Science (CS) and 
security communities. 
Effect on the adversary: Increased monitoring adds risk for the adversary by increasing the 
likelihood that malicious activities will be observed. 
Time Frame and Cost: 2 - 3 years to develop consensus and model legislation.  Another 2 – 5 
years for adoption.  Cost should be in the modest millions for staff, travel, and compensation for 
panel members. 
5.2.10. Research support for cyber defense science 
Problem:  Research support for cyber defense science 
Solution/Move: Invest in, and stimulate investment in, people and communities of researchers to 
create and sustain a basis of innovative groups in this area. 
Rationale: We don’t yet have concrete technical advances needed to accomplish many of the 
objectives named in some of the other “moves”, and future needs we have not yet encountered.  
Execution:  Increase funding available to research programs in cyber science, such as National 
Science Foundation (NSF) cybertrust and Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(IARPA) Information Assurance (IA) research; create new unclassified Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) programs addressing some of the NCDI moves; create 
funding sources for development of security analysis tools. Provide funding for research 
programs (lasting 5 years) rather than projects (lasting 1-2 years), to give them the chance to 
develop new highly qualified personnel, and graduates competent in the employment of the 
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research accomplishments and associated basic engineering knowledge. Encourage and advertise 
internship programs in industry. 
Barriers & Synergies -  new capability -- market resistance:  Barrier: the perception that 
research results are too narrow and not directed toward national goals. Synergy: challenging 
technical problems attract tremendous spontaneous effort from a wide range of universities and 
research institutions. Industry also needs security graduates. 
Timeframe & Costs:  This is a long-term continuing thrust, which should be thought of as 
infrastructure maintenance. Present total USG security-related yearly research funding is on the 
order of 100M, less than 10% of which is earmarked for educational support. This should be 
multiplied by (what? 5, 10?) 
What’s New:  While organizational support for cyber-related research and education exists, 
cyber warfare needs call for a significantly higher level of support, the bulk of which should be 
unclassified, and with a higher proportion for educational programs and security analysis tool 
development. 
Impact on Vision: Because of the dynamic nature of the adversarial environment, the cyber 
defense vision cannot be accomplished in the long term without continuing significant support 
for education and research leading to qualified personnel and innovative ideas. 
5.2.11. Authentication Based on Distributed Dynamic Labels6  
Problem:  The most insidious and serious class of weaknesses associated with identity 
management revolves around attackers who plant artifices to subvert the very mechanisms relied 
on to provide system protections for the credentials. 
Solution/Move: Create and deploy a hierarchical infrastructure of pervasive, interoperable, and 
secure identity credentials for individuals and components. 
Rationale: DoD, IC, DHS, but also US industry, as it provides transparently interoperable 
credentials across private and public sectors. 
Execution: The authentication of what is at the other end of wire leverages (1) a quality attribute 
for certificates; (2) a Distributed Dynamic Label protocol for chains of certificates; and (3) 
actually-secure components at select nodes in the infrastructure. Relying parties will be able to 
securely and reliably discern differences in trust levels for these credentials as against the relying 
parties’ own policies, even for disparate credentials issued by a multitude of information 
technology providers using a variety of commercial and government products, practices and 
procedures. Each credential is processed as part of a chain of certificates; each such certificate 
embeds an integral quality attribute enabling end-point applications to locally construct the 
credential’s Distributed Dynamic Label using a greatest-lower-bound calculation over all the 
attributes in each certificate in the chain; and end points interpret this label based on a layering of 
policies such that local policies are only interpreted locally, enabling the end point reliably to 
determine how much trust to place in the accuracy of the credential. 
Barriers & Synergies: A barrier is that a missing quality attribute limits value of credential.  
This means that this tends to become a mandatory part of the infrastructure. 
Synergistic with DHS creation of common Personal Identity Verification (PIV) credentials per 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12. 
Timeframes & Costs: 3-5 years and $20-40m per year. 
                                                
6 This particular input was contributed by an individual member of the working group, but there was insufficient time to vet the item with the 
whole group. 
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What’s New: The use of distributed validation changes the rules by empowering the relying 
party to determine which input meets their specific authentication needs.   Build it right – 
actually-secure at critical nodes  This provides a pervasive & interoperable credential that can be 
quickly deployed initially using available high-assurance TCB technology and is highly scalable. 
How Does This Defeat Adversary: The core of the threat model is subversion of the base 
operating system and hardware platform.  A classic “2-card loader” exemplifies it:  the attacker 
plants a software bootstrap artifice during the lifecycle and at the time of attack triggers it to read 
in a malicious program as data and transfer control to the attack program.  This trumps all 
mechanisms relied on for protection today.  To verify that system protection significantly 
mitigates this threat, one must build security-critical nodes on high-assurance platforms - those at 
a minimum meeting requirements last made coherent as the Class A1 criteria.  By building it 
right, you force the adversary to defeat a high-assurance TCB.  That would be exponentially 
more expensive to the attacker and less damaging than an attack on today’s cyber infrastructure 
that has little defense against subversion. 
5.3. Group C 
Group C was primarily focused on long term (7 – 10 years) research agenda, with some items of 
a social-political nature.   
 
Group C developed an initial list of 10 moves (see below). The list was then further refined 
taking into account the maturity of the move idea and the knowledge in the group. This resulted 
in seven moves that were addressed in subgroups of 2-3 people. Each subgroup was chartered 
with completing a move plan consisting of: 
 
• Move Description 
• Rationale 
• Execution  
• Time Frame  
• Barriers and Synergies 
• How the Move Contributes to the Vision  
 
The degree of completeness and adherence to this template varied. All seven of the moves were 
described and, in most cases, aspects of the above characteristics were identified. Some of this 
was due to time constraints, and some due to the nature of the move and how well it fit in the 
above framework.  
 
1. Develop predictably composable trustworthy systems. 
2. Develop capability to engineer trustworthy systems, based on quantitative and qualitative 
arguments. 
3. Application specific trustworthy platforms (MT). 
4. Authentication by default; id and attribution with privacy. 
5. Collaborative defense. 
6. Quantitative trustworthiness metrics and evaluation frameworks. 
7. High-assurance development and operational environments. 
8. Operate through adversities. 
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9. Transform the IT supply chain to address market imperfections, incentives for tech 
update. 
10. Education – human capital development, seed projects. 
5.3.1. Develop predictably composable trustworthy systems 
E.g., Create “Availability–Integrity” Architecture for Process Control. Inherently secure systems 
Move: Develop inherently secure architectures with Predictable interactions and are Composable 
by design. Restrict the possibility of malware and compromise 
Rationale: Composability encompasses requirements, interfaces, specifications, theories, 
programs, metrics, analyses, and verification. Composable recovery and re-execution 
Rationalize for composibility 
Execution: 10 parallel projects, selected domains, vertical slices. Use Interface contracts. 
Leverage modern hardware capacity and structured memory. Employ mathematically strong 
programming language with clean semantics. 
Time frame: 7-10 years 
Barriers and synergies: Hard problem, complexity, limited worked examples for confidentiality 
and fault tolerance. Build on classical papers. Lack of Assessment, metrics, models. Need Better 
verification tools, programming languages 
How contributes to vision: 
What’s new/different:  
5.3.2. Develop capability to engineer trustworthy systems 
Move:  Develop capability to engineer trustworthy systems, based on quantitative and qualitative 
arguments. Create criteria to rank system-level designs with respect to trust properties and 
evaluate systems accordingly. Make rational choices among alternate designs to increase 
trustworthiness. Use Assessment-driven design 
Rationale: Computing power now exists to mechanize exploration of design space 
Advances in model checking, measurements, simulation, and stochastic analysis methods make 
analysis practical. Relative ranking is simpler than absolute metrics. Gain higher programmer 
productivity. 
Execution: Choose targeted case studies in the critical application domains. Develop tools and 
technologies for assessment-driven design.  Develop a method for documentation, auditing, 
verification, evaluation. Enhance and deploy a method for simultaneously evaluating alternate 
design choices at cost lower than individual evaluations. Full reification of the design and 
development process 
Time frame: 3-5 years 
Barriers and synergies: Cultural barrier crosses disciplines. Education improvements needed. 
Advances in modeling and assessment are needed. 
How contributes to vision:  
What’s new/different:  
5.3.3. Authentication by default; identification and attribution with privacy 
Ubiquitous naming of network devices and envelopes 
Move: Develop mechanisms that provide reliable information about the pedigree of information. 
Opt in/out and beyond. Attacker can no longer compromise multiple hosts and send anonymous 
packets – increase risk to attacker. 
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Rationale: Improve basis for deciding to communicate. Fundamental enabler giving Attribution 
at the device level. 
Execution: Mathematical certainty about identity of all players. Means to ensure that identity is 
immutable. Means to ensure scalability across architectural elements. Study trade-offs between 
privacy and authentication. 
Time frame: 3-5 years – initial capability. 5-10 years – continuing evolution 
Barriers and synergies: Backward compatibility, migration. IPv6 deployment. Support higher 
level constructs 
How contributes to vision:  
What’s new/different:  
5.3.4. Collaborative defense 
Sharing real-time attack information 
Socio/cultural/political 
Move: Research sharing and cooperative analysis of detection, alerts, diagnoses, threats, attacks, 
response, and remediation. Create the ability to deal with attacks in progress and future attacks. 
Break out of the enterprise constraint and crossing administrative and international boundaries. 
Generate a patch for software from collaboratively gathered failures. Generate a signature for 
attack from collaboratively generated. Develop secure information sharing mechanisms. 
Rationale: More rapid discovery and reaction to attacks. Leverage the scale of the defenders. 
This might be the only way to detect stealthy attacks 
Execution: Develop a way to communicate securely during an attack. Develop means for 
negotiating varying levels of trust. Response strategy. Study social/cultural impediments to 
sharing. 
Time frame: 3-10 years 
Barriers and synergies: Synergies from coordinating defense. Common mode failure is a 
synergy. Trust and privacy are barriers. 
How contributes to vision: 
What’s new/different: 
5.3.5. Quantitative trustworthiness metrics and evaluation frameworks  
5.3.6. Operate through adversities 
Faults, errors, failures, and attacks  
Adaptive, self-healing, autonomic 
5.3.7. Transform the IT supply chain  
Move:  Transform the IT supply chain to address market imperfections and create incentives for 
tech uptake. Motivate/sell need for secure IT technology for commodity Internet in relevant 
economic terms. Create the ability to manage the secure IT supply chain from conception of 
security “moves” to implementation and commercial deployment. Secure IT services target all 
users (commercial, private and government). 
Rationale: Domestic private sector owns the Internet in USA. Multinational private sector 
develops equipment. Their economic interests are often not consistent with perceived security 
needs. Leverage and subsidize private sector investments. Rapid deployment of critical security 
technology 
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Time Frame: 5-7 years  
5.3.8. Education – human capital development, seed projects 
Partnership among industry, government, and academia 
Move: Create unclassified national security research institutes. Academic, private, and 
government players. Facilitate leaves of absence, internships, and sabbaticals. Address 
intellectual property issues. Revamp individual proposal-funding processes with respect to 
education. Make longer term grants consistent with graduate student life-cycles. Add funding to 
increase research base. 
Rationale: Critical application-driven research across multiple research topics. 
Challenge problem. New kinds of cross-disciplinary skill-sets are required to achieve collective 
objectives. Foster teaming and competitiveness. 
Time-Frame: 3-10 years 
5.3.9. Emerging networking paradigm shifts 
Move: Explore security issues pertaining to migrating network architectures  in wireless and 
wired commodity Internet (esp. IPv6). 
Rationale: Growth of IPv6 in Asia and Europe and need to maintain competitiveness 
(multinational vendors) in such networking technologies. Also competitiveness regarding 
compatibility (domestic ISPs/carriers) in such networking. Emerging tiered service and 
associated billing even in IPv4 core (network neutrality vein). Profitability dominance of 
wireless access over balance of commodity Internet. Potentially improved protection of digital 
commerce, human identity, packet/flow attribution, and situational awareness in new networking 
architectures. 
Execution: Migration strategies, secure routing and name resolution design and transition. 
Additional features to enable range of trade-offs between privacy and authentication in various 
contexts. Leverage prototypical deployments of (IPv4 over IPv6 or maybe vice-versa) in the 
DoD. 
Time Frame: 3-5 years  
Barriers: Economic incentives for domestic private sector Internet Service Providers 
(ISP)s/carriers/telecommunication companies (telcos). Economic incentives for multinational 
vendors? 
How contributes to vision: 
What’s new/different: 
5.3.10. Research management process 
Institute: Academic, private, and government players  
Multiple institutes incorporating the best of IDA, Santa Fe Institute, former Bell Labs 
Leaves of absence, internships, sabbaticals. Intellectual property issues. 
Critical application driven research across multiple research topics 
Funding process: Longer term grants at universities. Non-intrusive monitoring and quick 
provision of help. Teaming. Challenge problems. 
5.3.11. Secure Emerging Networks 
Move: Explore security issues pertaining to migrating network architectures in wireless and 
wired commodity Internet (including IPv6 and Network Address Translation (NAT) issues). 
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Migration strategies, secure routing and name resolution system design and transition. Additional 
features to enable a range of trade-offs between privacy and authentication in various contexts. 
Leverage prototypical deployments of (IPv4 over IPv6 or maybe vice-versa) in DoD. 
Rationale: Growth of IPv6 in Asia and Europe and need to maintain competitiveness 
(multinational vendors) in such networking technologies. Security implications of emerging 
tiered service offerings, and associated billing systems, even in IPv4 core. Profit-dominance and 
pervasiveness of wireless access over balance of commodity Internet – more carefully metered 
but greater risk of selfish/malicious “interference”. Pervasive sensing and embedded systems 
mainly with wireless connectivity.  Maintain competitiveness regarding operational compatibility 
(domestic ISPs/carriers) with such networks. Improve: protection of digital commerce, human 
identity, packet/flow attribution (layer 3), and situational awareness in new networking 
architectures  
Time Frame: 3-5 years  
 
6. Moves-to-Capabilities Mapping 
   
The following matrix was created by a side-group to examine the mapping between the proposed 
strategic moves and categories of capabilities sought.  The numbers in the cells indicate a 
subjective view of the degree to which the move in that row supports the capability category in 
the column.  Color coding is simply to highlight the degree numbers.  The purpose of the matrix 
was two-fold: (1) to see how well the moves that folks generated covered the space of 
capabilities and where gaps might lie, and (2) to gain a general sense of how one might go about 
assessing which moves might have the highest strategic impact toward achieving desired 
capabilities.  We point out that the analysis was cursory and is meant to be a sketch to guide the 
workshop.  Further analysis, including rationale for each cell entry would be needed to make 
fundamental investment decisions. 
 
The capabilities in the columns are strawman capabilities developed by a small subgroup of the 
workshop team.  These capabilities are described in more detail in the section entitled “Stimulus 
Capabilities.”  Other capabilities were identified in the course of the workshop.  A follow-up 
action of revising the matrix with the combined set of modified moves and updated capabilities 
list would be valuable. 



















8 Stratify Architec ture 3 2 1 1 3 1 0
18 Reconsit itution 0 0 1 1 3 1 0
23 Redundancy in Infrastruc ture 2 1 1 1 3 2 0
24 Composable Trust 3 0 0 0 3 3 3
31 Operate through adversity 2 2 2 3 3 0 0
32 xform IT supply chain 3 1 0 1 3 3 2
2 Spec ial Purpose Devices 3 1 0 0 3 3
35 Develop national continuity plan 3
36 Creation of a boot sequence 3
1 Protec ted Administration 3 0 1 0 2 1 0
7 SCADA as Exemplar 2 2 2 1 2 1 1
9 Lifecyc le 3 0 0 2 2 3 2
10 Risk Assess Value 2 0 2 2 2 3 3
12 ID Management for CIP (admin) 3 2 2 2 2 1 0
14 Dynamic  Security 3 1 2 0 2 0 2
15 Testbeds 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
19 SW Engineering issues 2 0 0 1 2 3 2
25 Arguably trustworthy systems 2 1 1 1 2 3 3
26 Appln Spec ific  TW platforms 3 1 1 1 2 2 0
11 Early Warning 1 3 1 3 2 0 0
3 System Liability 2 0 1 0 1 3 1
5 Diversity of Control 3 0 0 0 1 1 0
6 Net Admission Control 3 2 2 0 1 1 0
13 Define Security 2 1 1 1 1 2 0
16 Appropriate Authentication 3 1 1 2 1 1 0
17 Attestation 3 1 1 0 1 3 0
20 Privacy/legal issues 1 3 1 3 1 2 1
21 Environment Aware processors 1 1 2 1 1 0 0
22 Secure Sys Eng. Competit ion 1 1 1 1 1 3 3
29 Quantitative TWness metric s 2 0 0 1 1 2 3
30 High Assurance Devel Environs 2 1 0 3 1 3 3
33 Human Capital development 3 1 1 1 1 3 3
34 National Keying Infrastruc ture 3 1 1 1 1 1 2
28 Collaborative defense 0 2 3 2 0 0 0
4 National Testbed
27 Authentication by default
 
 
7. End States—Top Down 
7.1. Group A 
After the group vetted all the “opening moves” we were focused on determining where we 
wanted the nation to be from a cyber security perspective.  We focused on working the problem 
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from the top-down starting at the end-state.  This allowed the group to determine if the moves we 
discussed would adequately lead the nation into a more protected state.   
 
Group A, once again working as one, contemplated the objectives or end-states that would need 
to be attained for this to happen.  We also mapped our opening moves into these end-states to 
ensure that we had coverage.   This is a work in progress and the group did not feel the task was 
completed.  The group was however, able to determine a number of end-states (goals) and map 
them back to our opening moves.  This section describes the end-states the identified opening 
moves and the potential research thrusts required to accomplish them.  Once the group 
completed three of the end-states, it formulated descriptive vignettes to further describe the 
nation’s state and how it could be improved. 
7.1.1. Continuity (Recovery) 
• Goal: The US critical infrastructure shall be able to sustain operations in the face of both 
static and adaptive attacks. The end-state divides up into 3 distinct sub-end-states or 
capabilities.  
 
– Capability: Fail Soft (The infrastructure must shed load gracefully according to 
identified criticality priorities) 
– Capability: Restore & Recover (The capability and resources to create a tested 
plan to recover core functions of the critical infrastructure and restore critical 
services must exist) 
– Capability: Rebuild (Expertise, plans, and architectures for reconstruction of 
critical infrastructure components damaged in an attack must exist) 
 
The following figure shows the three capabilities as they relate to the end state.  As one moves 
from left to right, the capabilities assume increasing degrees of failure and therefore increasing 
degrees of repair needed.  The restore and recover capability was analyzed further as an 
examplar to show the moves needed to support it.  The other two capabilities would require 
similar analysis but we stopped short due to a lack of time. 
 
For each capability, we need the ability to plan the strategy of recovery, architect the solution, 
and to diagnose failures quickly.  The diagnosis is needed to both mitigate failure as part of 
recovery and to discover underlying cause so that there is a feedback into the planning and 
architecture steps to avoid those failures in the future or at least minimize their damages. 
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Research Thrust Notes 
 
Continuity: stratification research thrusts 
1. Assess data and programs (low to high) for malware 
2. Assess data (high to low) for covert channels 
3. Architectural designs (e.g., alternatives to von Neumann architecture) 
4. Information sharing of a stratified network versus an interconnected network (not 
stratified). Is this largely a human behavior problem? 
 
Continuity Vignette 
• Desired end state: 
Continuity Recover from natural and adaptive 
adversarial attack
(Red team anticipates adaption of adversary )
“International Connections” 
Fail Soft
“shed functionality in reverse priority 
order never falling below minimum”   
Rebuild
(assume lost total function )
Recover / Restore





Mechanisms for honoring priorities
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–  Ability to fail soft and recover from a cyber attack 
• Determine activities/moves to reach end state 
• Use vignette to work backwards and provide granular actions 
– Actions could be part of a R&D program for achieving move 
 
1. Create a series of vignettes, have the sectors (e.g. electric power, telecommunications, 
banking) apply our priorities and moves to see what the gaps are across sectors. 
 
2. An attack happens that takes out 50% of the critical infrastructure in 3 of the critical sectors. 
Fortunately, we had some strategic warning, had trained people, rehearsed on a test bed, 
recognize mission priorities and shed unessential customers which handled 90% of our problem 
and we shed the other 10% of the subscriber traffic shunted to control plane. Kept minimal 
functionality due to stratification, for critical subscribers; we have strong authentication.    
 
3. A remote administration attack: we introduce one flaw that propagates throughout an entire 
critical system via remote administration and takes down the network. Include local 
administrative actions; look at the control plane / subscriber plane interaction. 
 
Before proceeding to discuss the individual vignettes and the moves that support them, we found 
it necessary to analyze the moves themselves and how those moves depend on each other.  This 
facilitated our ability to analyze how the end states depend on the moves. 
 
The following diagram depicts the move dependencies.  We observed that this type of analysis 
could eventually be useful is judging which moves are most fundamental and which are more 
important than others.  We hasten to add that our analysis was not complete enough to draw such 
conclusions from our work here.  We are sure that we are missing some dependencies due to a 
lack of time.  The analysis should be viewed as a sketch to be completed later by others focused 
on that specific task. 
 
In the diagram, a directed arrow from move A to move B means that move A supports move B.  
There is much analysis that goes into each arrow regarding why and how one moves supports 
another.  Group A did not capture that analysis due to limited time, but such analysis is needed.  
Each arrow deserves extensive description as moves are planned and executed. 







The scenario is as follows. 
 
An attack is initiated which will take out 50% of the critical infrastructure in 3 critical sectors 
(7% of core).  The attack targets a latent flaw introduced into infrastructure administration 
components through a lifecycle attack.  The attack is to be triggered by a remote administrative 
command. 
 
In the sequence of diagrams that follow, we describe aspects of the attack and how moves 
mitigate the affects of those attacks.  The sequences is not necessarily in time sequence of the 
attack.  The colored blocks on the bottom of each move box represents a connection to the each 












Redundancy in Logical 















End State CONTINUITY: The US critical infrastructure shall be able to sustain  
operations in the face of both static and adaptive attacks 










Redundancy in Logical 
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One might assume that the attack will take down all systems on the network that are being 
remotely administered. Since this element of the core is not remotely administered, the attack 
fails. 
 
The attack is not completely successful; it only took out a small fraction of the core; remote 










Redundancy in Logical 
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The critical element of the core is not only not remotely administered, but architecturally 




Remote administration is more costly because the critical infrastructure element is 













Redundancy in Logical 
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Stratification may mean that this portion of the infrastructure is either layered or partitioned, but 
not isolated, from other elements of the infrastructure that depend upon it.  This critical portion 












Redundancy in Logical 










The network segment has been stratified because an analysis has been 
conducted which identified it as a high-priority segment. 
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The priority assignment has been based on a valuation of critical 












Redundancy in Logical 
















The valuation is supported by exercises conducted by a cyber counter-
intelligence force employing a national testbed designed to emulate the 











Redundancy in Logical 
















The cyber counter-intelligence service exists because the nation has trained 
and developed people who have the skills necessary to assess vulnerabilities 










Redundancy in Logical 
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7.1.2. Protect and Defend 
The group developed two possible taxonomies for considering a Protect and Defend end-state.  
We present both in the diagram below for completeness, but we settled on the second taxonomy 
as the basis of our analysis.  An analysis from the perspective of the first taxonomy would almost 

















Redundancy in Logical 
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• Goal: Ensure that an adversary cannot economically achieve confidence in his ability to 
cause strategic damage to the US critical infrastructure. 
 
– Capability: Hardening (make it more difficult to successfully degrade an asset 
with an attack) 
– Capability: Isolation (ensure that adversaries must mount separate attacks in 
order to damage separate assets) 
– Capability: Deterrence (create consequences which raise the cost to an 
adversary of attacking assets) 
– Capability: Redundancy (provision excess capacity which the adversary must 
expend additional resources to attack) 
– Capability: Maneuver (move the asset to avoid adversary attacks) 
– Capability: Hiding (hide the existence or location of assets from the adversary) 




Attacks   (2) 
1950’s Taxonomy for Aircraft Survivability 
   
          Hardening 
          Maneuvering 
          Hiding 
          Redundancy 
          Active defense 
          Isolation 
          Deception (Decoy) 




An organization has infiltrated an operative into a critical infrastructure organization.  The 
operative attempts to disrupt the operation of an infrastructure component.  The attack is 





End State PROTECT: Ensure that an adversary cannot economically achieve  
confidence in his  ability to cause strategic damage to the US critical infrastructure 
Deception Maneuver Hiding Redundanc
y 







Adversary CNA Redundancy Diversity 
Special Purpose 
Devices 



























The organization presents evidence to the judge that the attack originated from the  







Adversary CNA Redundancy Diversity 
Special Purpose 
Devices 






















The traceback indicates an IP address, but because the system in question is a critical 
infrastructure element every system used to access it must support appropriate 
authentication, which permits authentication.  The authentication is supported by an 







Adversary CNA Redundancy Diversity 
Special Purpose 
Devices 




























Only compliant systems can access the critical infrastructure element because the 
critical infrastructure element is stratified, and access to it requires client systems to 








Adversary CNA Redundancy Diversity 
Special Purpose 
Devices 
























Because the system is stratified and we know the IP address we can attest the system to find out  
what software it is running.  The infrastructure requires appropriate authentication, the attacker must  








Adversary CNA Redundancy Diversity 
Special Purpose 
Devices 
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Move: Appropriate Authentication 
Problem: Eliminate the ability of people to damage critical infrastructure without attribution 
and the attendant risk.  Currently we can’t hold individuals responsible for actions online. 
Move: Create the capability for appropriate authentication for individuals who use the critical 
infrastructure; use of this infrastructure is a privilege, not a right. 
Rationale: Identifying people allows us to impose accountability and deterrence. 
Execution: NIST FIPS standards for government operators and acts of congress and resultant 
regulations for private sector operators. 
Timeframe: An initial capability can be in place within three years based largely on existing 
technology. 
Barriers: Privacy concerns. 
Investment Thrust: Research is required into what authentication technique will be most 
effective; this probably does not require invention of new technology.  New policy is required 
and there is also an investment in deployment and integration of new capability. 
What’s New: Critical infrastructure operators have previously relied more on personnel 
security, physical security, and stratification rather than strong authentication in the cyber 
infrastructure.  Applying a requirement for strong authentication to an identified sector is new. 
 
Summary of Proposed Moves 
• Non-remote administration 
• Special-purpose devices 
• National testbed 
• Diversity of control 
• Network admission control 
• Use SCADA as exemplar 
• Stratify architectures 
• Prevent lifecycle attacks 
• Assess threats and asset values 
• Create early warning system 
• Require strong identity for access to critical infrastructure 
• Impose liability for security failures 
 
7.2. Group B (End States and Thrusts) 
In this phase of the workshop, Group B organized its moves and their related capabilities into 
major research thrusts.  The research thrusts were then mapped to end-states that would support 
the overall goal of “information dominance.” The group developed a set of descriptive vignettes 
to illustrate the necessity and utility of the resulting organization of ideas.  A spreadsheet was 
used to relate the group’s moves to research thrusts, and a flow chart shows how the moves relate 
to the vignettes and support the end states.  Five vignettes were developed in prose style and are 
included below. 
7.2.1. Know Thy Network 
1. Know what's on my network at all times: know the traffic and know what's connected 
   Know what's in my platform. [No unauthorized stuff/elements/activities/behavior on my 
platform]  
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   related capability: View  
   Research thrust (moves):  
       situational awareness visualization 
       advanced network data analysis 
       advanced network sensor development 
       authentication of principals  
       attestation 
       (environment aware processors?) 
       privacy/legal issues 
       note that "view" only covers knowing what's there, not controlling what's there. 
       to include preventing unauthorized stuff requires moves from Protect/Defend.  
7.2.2. Confidentiality-Preserving Systems 
2 a) No intellectual property leakage from my systems/networks 
  b) No unauthorized exfiltration 
  [This is a Protect/Defend concern] 
7.2.3. Predictable Good System Behavior 
3. no unexpected/unknown/unanticipated software/events/behaviors (including exfiltration) on 
platform  
  [seems to be a View item, with substantial overlap with 1 above] 
7.2.4. Identifiable Data Integrity 
4. identifiable data integrity (on platform) 
7.2.5. U.S. Cyberspace Dominance 
5. US dominance of cyber space and/or Cyber Mutually Assured Destruction 
   View, Respond, React all seem to contribute  
7.2.6.  Instrumented Network Infrastructure 
6. Instrumented network infrastructure / situational awareness / cyber geography  
    View, superset of 1a, add: 
    produce the routers etc for the opposition 
7.2.7. Secure ubiquitous communication 
7. a. Secure ubiquitous communication /  
      [Protect and defend, but may also need Respond (as to DoS attack)] 
   b. rapid access to authorized data from where you are  
      [Protect and defend, but may also need Respond (as to DoS attack)] 
7.2.8. Trustworthy identity 
8. Trustworthy identity (people and things) 
     [View] 
 



















































Protec ted Administration 3 0 1 0 2 1 0 7 6
Spec ial Purpose Devices 3 1 0 0 1 3 8 5
System Liability 2 0 1 0 1 3 1 8 4
Diversity of Control 3 0 0 0 1 1 0 5 4
Net Admission Control 3 2 2 0 1 1 0 9 8
SCADA as Exemplar 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 11 9
Stratify Architec ture 3 2 1 1 3 1 0 11 10
Lifecyc le 3 0 0 2 2 3 2 12 7
Risk Assess Value 2 0 2 2 2 3 3 14 8
Early Warning 1 3 1 3 0 0 0 8 8
ID Management for CIP (admin) 3 2 2 2 2 1 0 12 11
1 vacant Define Security 2 1 1 1 1 2 0 8 6
2 vacant Dynamic  Security 3 1 2 0 2 0 2 10 8
3 Testbed-071205-DRAFT.doc Testbeds 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 14 10
4 Accountable_internet_071204.ppt Appropriate Authentication 3 1 1 2 1 1 0 9 8
5 Robust Platform Management a.ppt Attestation 3 1 1 0 1 3 0 9 6
6 vacant Reconsit itution 0 0 1 1 3 1 0 6 5
7 Millen-research.doc SW Engineering issues 2 0 0 1 2 3 2 10 5
8 Mchugh-privacy.txt Privacy/legal issues 1 3 1 3 1 2 1 12 9
9 Call Home a.doc Environment Aware processors 1 1 2 1 1 0 0 6 6
10 Move - Competit ion.ppt Secure Sys Eng. Competit ion 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 11 5
11 vacant Redundancy in Infrastruc ture 2 1 1 1 3 2 0 10 8
12 Trusted-Dist-071205-DRAFT.doc Trusted Distribution Authority
13 Authenticate-071205-DRAFT.doc Authentication of Princ ipals
14 USGConfigurationMgt.ppt USG Configuration Management
15 Exploitation.ppt Assessment of Public  Infra. Sys scada
Advanced Network Sensor Dev.     
Advanced Network Data Analysis privacy
Situational Awareness Visualization      
Improve boundary defense Hi Son
Attack Containment Capability
Automated Forensic  Capability
(Info) War Game Simulation
Composable Trust 3 0 0 0 3 3 3 12 6
Arguably trustworthy systems 2 1 1 1 2 3 3 13 7
Appln Spec ific  TW platforms 3 1 1 1 2 2 0 10 8
Collaborative defense 0 2 3 2 0 0 0 7 7
Quantitative TWness metric s 2 0 0 1 1 2 3 9 4
High Assurance Devel Environs 2 1 0 3 1 3 3 13 7
Operate through adversity 2 2  3 3 0 0 10 10
xform IT supply chain 3 1 0 1 3 3 2 13 8
Human Capital development 3 1 1 1 1 3 3 13 7
National Keying Infrastruc ture 3 1 1 1 1 1 2 10 7
 
 
Below are some notes on how to interpret this chart. 
 
o The chart represents Group B’s*working notes for the discussion when they were pushing 
ideas toward the end-state/capability/thrust/move taxonomy, specifically, the 
view/respond/react capabilities assigned to Group B. 
o The first column maps to specific moves Group B wrote up. 
o The three items in the vignette column (Scada, privacy, “hi son”) represent a color coded 
draft mapping from moves to the vignettes. Scada relates to the competition vignette.  
Group B had an idea for a privacy vignette that did not materialize. “Hi Son” was well-
developed as a vignette. 
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o The “Advanced Sensor Dev” move through the “(Info) Wargame Simulation” were some 
of those added by Group B add to support key capabilities.  The moves are not further 
described anywhere due to a lack of time, but one-liners are included below.  
 
o Advanced Network Sensor Dev.  -- generation of situational awareness data, 
including behind enemy lines 
o Advanced Network Data Analysis  -- distilling information from the above data 
o Situational Awareness Visualization  -- generation of visual representation of data 
and information, to leverage human processing (visual) power to aid with 
understanding the data and information 
o Improve boundary defense    -- network boundary defense 
o Attack Containment Capability  -- think of this as the network analog to how the 
"principle of least privilege" helps contain faults and vulnerabilities in an OS 
o Automated Forensic Capability -- tools for post facto analysis of security faults, 
intrusions, attacks, etc. 
o  (Info) War Game Simulation -- tools for simulating large-scale attacks and the 
effects of potential responses 
o The dark green elements under View, Respond and React are moves that would be 
necessary to provide those capabilities. 
o The light green move highlight indicates that the move supports the privacy vignette, and 
dark green highlighted moves indicate indirect support of privacy. 
o Similarly orange indicates support of the Scada/competition vignette, and yellow 
indicates indirect support. 
 
Error! Objects cannot be created from editing field codes. 
 
7.2.9. Vignette: Calling Home 
Hi, momma! You remember me. I am one of your platforms from the July, 2010 group. 
 
My “wake on WiMax” service just woke me up. As is often the case, this Access Point is in a 
Starbucks (number 613,178 for reference). 
 
I am really glad that you got the Call Home channel standardized on ALL wireless access points 
and networks for situations like this. 
 
Attached is the default platform compliance evidence that you normally ask for in order to 
establish trust between us. 
 
After not talking with you for 2 months, 7 days, 17 hours, 16 minutes, and 13 seconds, I would 
normally ask you to provision me with all your most recent updates. 
 
However, I am on battery power and am concerned that “We have a problem”. 
 
I have incremental dynamic situational evidence for you.  
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My object recognition service has been looking through my camera and tells me that I am in a 
box with what look like a bunch of other laptops. Many of them (23 to be exact) responded when 
I tried to talk to them via the Local Friends ad hoc networking protocol. They picked me to call 
home since I had the best remaining battery charge. 
 
Attached is their default compliance evidence also. 
 
A few of the boxes don’t respond. Maybe they contain those other kinds of processors that you 
told me about. They must either be arrogant or ignorant. Maybe they don’t know how to call 
their momma and are ashamed. 
 
My motion detector tells me that we are not moving. My GPS location detector tells me that we 
are in someplace called Venezuela. The Access Point says that the town we are in is called 
Caracas. All my Local Friends tell me that Venezuela is well outside their historic geographic 
ranges. I have never been to Venezuela before either and, as you told me to be, I am concerned. 
 
My temperature and humidity sensors tell me that it is extremely hot and humid relative to my 
historic climatic range. 
 
I don’t think I like it here. 
 
Momma, there is a man outside. He opened my top and, as I am supposed to do, I awaited his 
authentication as one of “my” humans. 
 
He tried five passwords, none of which are on any of my lists. His finger prints don’t match any 
of those on any of my lists either. My face recognition service looked through my camera and 
saw him. My face recognition service doesn’t recognize him either. My face heuristics service 
classifies him as what “my” humans would call “ugly”. 
 
My voice recognition service says that his signature doesn’t match any of “my” humans and that 
he is probably not speaking “English”. It says that by his volume and pitch, he could be 
classified as “yelling” at me. 
 
I have added his measured characteristics profile to my suspicious humans database (aka my “not 
OK” list) and appended it to this message. 
 
Through my protected sprite interface and later through my voice service I told him that he is 
“not recognized” and thus “not authorized” to use my platform. 
 
Momma, he has been beating on my keyboard. Its excessive force and wear sensors told me so. 
 
I told him to stop or I would turn power off to the rest of the platform (even across power cycles) 
until I talked to my momma. None of my Local Friends recognize his profile either and, based 
upon his failed interactions with me, they are all in agreement and are ready to do the same. 
 
I don’t like strangers very much, particularly ones who beat on my keyboard. 
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Do you want to send me that special “become a brick” key you told me about that we use in 
situations like this to reencrypt all of our non-volatile storage? 
 
You need to decide quickly as my motion detector tells me that we are moving again. 
 
Oh, I have just found the Caracas chapter of Local Friends Emergency Response/Recovery 
network and am reporting the same information to them. Perhaps they will send human Police to 
help. 
 
7.2.10. Vignette:  Blow Up! 
A: if nothing is done 
Future SCADA/ICS technology acquired from lowest cost vendors; supply chain open. 
1. insider compromise: disgruntled operator exceeds his authority and intentionally loads 
malware onto control system or enables remote access. Damage triggered. 
 
B: remote compromise using software artifices (subversion) in interfacing components attached 
to Internet. Enables access to wide range of devices in SCADA network yielding remote 
takeover of significant portion (all?) of SCADA system. Substantial Damage (e.g. huge pipeline 
fire, significant flooding) occurs, can’t pin the damage on an individual or even a country. 
 
C: testbed, competition, trusted distribution authority, authentication, accountable internet 
 
Trustworthy authentication of operator, limitation of privilege prevents malware installation. OR 
Operator has authority and installs malware. Trusted distribution system developed through 
testbed and competitions was installed and restricts operator to installing certified distribution 
and installation fails. 
 
Remote compromise:  
Domestically produced (from new expertise available through competition) high-assurance 
components at SCADA/Internet interface can’t be subverted. Trusted distribution authority 
prevents installation of compromised components. Accountable internet enables 
identification/rejection (non-identifiable traffic can be rejected) of attacking individual/country.   
Attacker may attempt to install alternative remote control device; thwarted by device 
authentication protocols. 
7.2.11. Vignette: Hi Son! 
Hi, son! This is your momma. Attached is my default platform compliance evidence that you 
normally ask for in order to establish trust between us. 
 
I need to talk to you. Where have you been? I haven’t been able to contact you since yesterday at 
3:47 PM PST – 7 hours, 29 minutes, and 3 seconds from when we were supposed to 
communicate. Did one of your humans turn your Out Of Band services off or place you where 
you couldn’t communicate? 
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Please send me your location, communication traffic, and human interaction logs since then so 
that I can analyze what threats you may have suffered from. 
 
I see that you are currently plugged into wall power and a wired network. That will give us 
plenty of time to get you checked and updated instead of having to turn you completely off as per 
our “out of touch too long” policies. I would have had to send you the special “become a brick” 
key that I told you about. However, since you called in soon enough, you don’t have to reencrypt 
all of your non-volatile storage. 
 
Since that time, our Cyber Threat Level has been raised to Orange. There are several newly 
recognized threats from the Cyber Threat Response Center. 
 
As you have not been accessible, you are considered particularly likely to either be compromised 
or prone to compromise. 
 
Yes, I know that you wouldn’t let anyone else alter your configuration without proper 
authentication and authorization, but sometimes combinatoric complexity does cause unexpected 
weaknesses/errors. 
 
There have been two (2) new severe attack vectors discovered based upon the combinatoric 
interactions between sets of configuration elements and resultant potential misbehavior 
(BADONE1 and BADONE2). 
 
The multivendor threat response teams have dynamically created mitigations for these 
combinatoric threats and provided them to the Cyber Threat Response Center 
 
Based upon my analysis of your last attested configuration and change sequence logs from 
yesterday, I need you to please remeasure the following elements of your configuration: 
• your Microsoft Internet Explorer, Flash Player, and Web services communication stack 
elements and  
• your Microsoft Word macros and templates and McAfee virus detection elements 
so that I can make sure whether (or not) you need reprovisioning or remediation. 
 
Yes, I know that you need me to provide my authorization evidence in order to establish my right 
to reprovision you. Attached is the evidence for which you ask. 
 
Thanks for those measurements. Based upon looking at them, you are not susceptible to the 
BADONE1 attack vector. However, I do notice two problems. 
 
First, you are susceptible to the BADONE2 attack vector and need to provision yourself with this 
multivendor update. I am very glad that I was able to check/update you before that vector got 
exploited. Had that occurred, I would have had to remediate you from “bare metal”. 
 
Second, I note that your FUBAR.ini file has been altered from what I last sent you.  
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Unfortunately, this has occurred several (297) times on the systems that I manage within my last 
corporate configuration management cycle. My analysis shows that the failure is caused/enabled 
by a mistake I made in access controls for FUBAR.ini. 
 
With your FUBAR.ini configured the way it is, in combination with the current settings of your 
SNAFU.upd, you are susceptible to the GOTCHA attack vector and thus need to provision 
yourself with this FUBAR.ini update and this access control update to keep it from reoccurring. 
 
I will send this FUBAR.ini event evidence to the Cyber Threat Response Center for analysis to 
see if they can see a pattern of this happening on a broader front across their broader multi-
company view of cyberspace. 
 
When done with these two sets of updates, as usual, please provide me with your attestation of 
your new overall configuration log and your change sequence log. 
 
With these updates, you should not be susceptible to the Cyber Threat Response Center’s 
recently discovered attack vectors. However, with the declared Cyber Threat Level of Orange, I 
need you to raise your intrusion detection thresholds to Level Seven. Here are the newly 
provided local Level Seven threshold analysis algorithms and metrics so that you can self judge 
what you detect in order to reduce unneeded network reporting traffic and generation of false 
positives. 
 
From your human interaction logs, I notice that you diagnosed a human intrusion attack attempt 
while you were out of contact. Your judgment was correct. I see that your attacker’s profile did 
not match any of your then current suspicious humans database (aka your “not OK” list). Please 
add his measured characteristics profile (password attempts, fingerprint, voice, and picture) on 
your suspicious-humans database. His profile was also previously unknown to me. We will add 
his profile to our suspicious-humans database, send it out to all our managed platforms, and send 
it along to the Cyber Threat Response Center for global distribution. 
 
Given this attempted attack, your authentication attempt thresholds should be higher for the next 
week. Please raise them to Level Seven. 
 
Please form a Local Friends ad hoc network with any other local Call Home capable platforms 
and ask/tell them to “call home” for the same process that we have just gone through in order to 
bring them all up to the same level of configuration and protection. 
 
If any of them are unable to contact me, please gather their configuration state attestations and 
forward them to me for analysis. 
 
Thanks son. I will talk to you again tomorrow, as usual, at the planned time. Feel free to call 
home if you register any threshold overages. 
7.2.12. Vignette; View Scenario 
Attack or not? 
Using situational awareness to to control response and reaction. 
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The Office of Applied Misinformation (OoAM) operates from a small (10,000 sq. ft) facility 
north of Harper's Ferry and about 500 feet underground. Its employees are highly trained, semi-
autonomous, and highly secretive.  Not even their administrative assistants are fully aware of the 
scope of their individual (or collective) activities. The management of the OoAM finds it nearly 
impossible to control the computer systems at HQ, primarily because the agents can always 
make compelling cases for whatever they want to do. This includes the occasional use of 
carefully modified versions of recent malcode. Although most of the operations are successful 
(the safe is full of highly classified letters of congratulation), there have been a few embarrassing 
incidents and management has instituted an extensive monitoring program in an attempt to 
reduce its exposure.   
 
The system, developed under the NCDI program earlier in the century, summarizes all traffic to 
and from the installation and can capture full traffic, on demand, for short intervals, no mean feat 
since the OoAM keeps its OC1776 pipe filled at times.  Fortunately, the legal studies sponsored 
by the NCDI have settled the relevant legal issues and OoAM has the same rights to monitor it's 
own networks as well as the networks of those foolish enough to send it traffic as those enjoyed 
by private industry, advertising agencies, spyware vendors and others. Using analytical 
techniques developed under the same program, activity profiles for both individual agents and 
the hardware and software suites they use are maintained.  Because of the nature of both the 
agents and their assignments, the profiles are highly volatile, and anomalies are called to the 
attention of the watch officers on a regular basis. Agent X is on an extended off site assignment.  
For some time, his profile has been consistent with a person operating 11 time zones away, 
access on an irregular basis from early evening until late morning, but the activity has been 
growing slowly and steadily over the past few weeks. Port and protocol percentages have been 
more or in less in line with recent historical usage by agent X, but he has stopped responding to 
email and his cell phone is always turned on, but not answered.  The incoming traffic is now 
originating from a large number of addresses, most, but not all, consistent with the agent's 
supposed locale. 
 
In an attempt to understand the situation, the director assigns the problem to a watch analyst who 
uses the latest NCDI visualization suite to try to make sense of the activities. 
 
The analyst starts by looking at protocol usage for the two subnets used by X. The '64 subnet 
shows that the best effort traffic dominates the reliable connection traffic by a large factor, 
unusual in itself.  Even more unusual is a small amount of traffic on every possible protocol, 
including reserved and undefined ones.  The '67 subnet, used exclusively by X and a few 
colleagues, is even stranger, with highly asymmetric inbound and outbound components. 
Attestation of these machines indicates that they were left operating with a new misinformation 
application partially installed and are generating large amounts of "noise."  They are turned off. 
 
At first glance, it looks as though two of the other machines used by X are slowly scanning. 
Large volumes of unidirectional traffic outbound, small amounts of inbound along with a control 
protocol.   The reality is that both machines are trying to connect to machines at non-responsive 
addresses, one to an internal address and the other to an external address. This appears to be 
related to the incomplete installation and these machines are also turned off. 
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When the analyst looks at X's primary workstation (a small supercomputer) he sees that the bulk 
of the best effort traffic, some 10^7 messages per hour, involves this machine as does the rogue 
protocol incident.  Using an interactive viewing component, the analyst selects the rogue 
protocol data and finds that it originated at another workstation on the '65 network.  This 
workstation is assigned to a summer intern.  When questioned, the intern says that, before he left, 
he was given a script by X and told to type it in and run it on February 28, "to see what happens." 
Although the ink on the script has faded, forensics is able make it visible.  It appears that X, up 
to his usual tricks, has educated yet another intern in the ways of misinformation. 
 
The best effort traffic is a different story.  The port usage indicates a non-standard application 
using ports in the 26K-28K range (Figure 5).  The application appears to be a variant of a 
popular multiplayer first party shooter game.  Looking at the history of the workstation, it 
appears to have responded to a random scan (Autonomic scan detection and blocking is one of 
the NCDI provided tools that the OoAM agents refuse to have deployed since it prevents them 
from interacting with potential intruders.), was rootkitted and made into a game server.  Except 
for the fact that 95% of the "players" are from the region where agent X is operating, the 
machine would be turned off.  A more detailed inspection is ordered and the sensor system is 
asked to do full packet capture for new player initial sessions.  Since we have the set of addresses 
that identify all players since infection, this is easily done.  The new player sessions indicate that 
the server has some "value added features." In addition to the game, it serves up an interesting 
complement of malware, including some of the OoAM's best spyware and propaganda applets. 
The list of active players is being regularly delivered to a remote player who possesses X's 
authentication credentials.  X is happily building a new misinformation cell amongst the game 
players of his temporary duty station and the case is closed, for now. 
7.2.13. Vignette StopLeak 
In December, 2017, Debbie Download, who works in the U.S. Department of Critical Services 
(DCS) hears a podcast about a new software component that could help her work more 
effectively. In the past, she knew it would have taken months or years to get approval to run the 
software from her IT and security departments, so she probably wouldn’t have paid much 
attention to the story.  There were reasons for this policy – the department had been plagued with 
leaks from malware that exploited vulnerabilities in software that others downloaded into the 
system. 
 
But the recently revitalized DCS IT infrastructure now permits immediate installation of 
software that either comes from the Trusted Distribution Authority or includes appropriate 
attestation mechanisms.  And the new system also provides safe “sandboxes” in which any 
software, regardless of how little is known about it, can be executed. Debbie normally uses these 
to open e-cards and other miscellaneous attachments that her friends send her – in fact, the 
system automatically opens them in sandboxes without any action on her part. Of course there 
are limits on what the sandboxed software can communicate with, but she can try things out 
without worry.  
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Today, it turns out that the software is available for download over the new Accountable Internet 
from a known vendor.  With those accountability mechanisms in place, Debbie installs the 
software in her normal work environment and tries it out.  
 
How did this happen? 
  
In 2008, the NCDI initiated a new program to distribute building blocks that had been produced 
for high-assurance purposes but had never been widely available at low cost. At the same time, it 
initiated a series of competitions for engineering new components and systems with defined 
security properties and the capability to support new functions without compromising the 
security assurance argument.  The competition took advantage of the tools and components 
available in the repository and attracted a new generation of programmers, engineers, and 
researchers to the field of trustworthy computing.  And it produced some new concepts for 
system architecture, exploiting improved methods for authentication of people and devices as 
well as attestation of software and platform configuration that, ten years later, had found their 
way into the DCS’s infrastructure. The Accountable Internet had also effectively eliminated the 
Denial of Service attacks that used to worry DCS CIOs, while also providing effective traceback 
when occasional errors and malfunctions did occur in the cyber infrastructure. 
  
Idea is to show how 
Testbed 
Competition 
Trusted Distribution Authority 
Authentication 
Will lead us out of the mess of exfiltration problems 
 
Today: 
This is the app that jack built. 
These are the flaws that hid in the app that jack built. 
This is the code so evil and small that exploited the flaws in the app that jack built 
This the rootkit so hidden and tricky installed by the code that exploited flaws in the app that 
jack built. 
These are the files so big and so fresh exfilled by the rootkit installed by the code that exploited 
the flaws in the app that jack built. 
 
This is the app that Jill built. 
It doesn’t have any flaws. Here’s why: 
Jill learned the essentials of secure system development by participating in a national secure 
system engineering competition.  
The competition drew on a sound base and used trustworthy tools obtained from the Trusted 
Distribution Authority for High-assurance. 
 
   59 
7.3. Group C 
7.3.1. Capability: Assessment 
Overarching metacapability encompassing trust, engineering and science; engineering recovery; 
and architecture 
Characteristics of Assessment.  
• Evaluation of systems must be pervasive throughout the development cycle. 
• Monitoring, measuring and evaluation of systems during operation are also essential. 
• Assessment must be composable and encompass relationships among different 
components, layers of abstraction, interfaces, successive evolutions, formal and informal 
analyses throughout the lifecycle. 
Relevant Moves 
• Support fundamental research in metrics and benchmarks 
• Establish supporting models that can scale to large systems 
• Tools and technologies to support the metrics and the methodologies 
• Evaluations based on models 
• Evaluations of the effectiveness of the methodologies  
Execution 
• Research in models for trustworthiness  encompassing security, reliability, survivability, 
safety, interoperability, maintainability, and so on 
• Research in creation and solution of models 
• Support for experimental science and technology 
• Research in measurement and auditing technologies 
• Mapping the metrics to models 
• Driven by real applications in defense, financial, power, health, and other sectors 
throughout the lifecycle 
Complementary Moves 
• Develop predictable composable trustworthy systems 
• Engineer trustworthy systems 
• High-assurance development and operational environments 
Barriers and Synergies 
• Past investment in security metrics has not been commensurate with reality, despite some 
successes for reliability, safety, correlated failures, and formal methods. 
• Analytical methods do not scale easily. 
• Much can still be learned from successes, within the overall rubric of trustworthiness.  
7.3.2. Capability: Operate Through Adversity 
• Move 1: Improve boundary defense by vulnerability-based rules 
 Rationale 
 Execution 
 Collect vulnerability information from all sources 
 Synthesize into vulnerability-based rules 
 Automate collection and synthesis process 
 Timeframe 
 Barrier & Synergies 
 Contribution to Vision 
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 Why Succeed? 
• Move 2: Build effective attack containment capability 
 Rationale  
 Execution 
 Architect  appropriate attack containment granularity 
 Create HW, SW, and protocol support for attack containment 
implementations 
 Improve identification and authentication for communication among 
regions 
 Specialize implementation by creating  containment rule wrt mission & 
policy 
 Timeframe 
 Barrier & Synergies 
 Contribution to Vision 
 Why Succeed? 
• Move 3: Improve attack discovery capability  
 Rationale  
 Execution 
 Integrate existing attack discovery technology 
 Timeframe 
 Barrier & Synergies 
 Contribution to Vision 
 Why Succeed? 
 
• Move 4: Retrospective Forensic Capability 
 Rationale  
 Execution 
 Determine medium amount of data that needs to be saved to do analysis, 
e.g., error reporting 
 Create Capability to find associated patterns in data 
 Timeframe 
 Barrier & Synergies 
 Contribution to Vision 
 Why Succeed? 
• Move 5: Create semi-Autonomous Response Capability: Contain, Recover, Repair 
 Rationale  
 Execution 
 Create methodology from determining, specifying, and reasoning about 
response effectiveness 
 Create testbeds for experimentally investigating response approaches 
 Create methods for arguably safe response 
 Timeframe 
 Barrier & Synergies 
 Contribution to Vision 
 Why Succeed? 
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7.3.3. Thrusts 
• Predictable Composability 
• Assessment: From Science to Demonstration 
• Private Sector Engaged 
• Shared Insight: Future Tech Vectors 
• Operate Through Adversity 
• Develop Required Human Resources 
 
For Each Thrust  
• End States 
• Vignette’s  
• Moves/Execution Plans 
 
7.3.4. Thrust 1: Predictable Composability 
Predictable composability applies to requirements, components, interfaces, authorization, 
accountability, configurability, usability, specifications, theories, programs, metrics, analyses, 
verification, and their interrelationships  
 
We refer to these abstractly as entities. 
 
Moves: Predictable Composability 
• Creation of a framework enabling systematic synergy among all of the components, 
structures, theories, and assessments 
• Creation of a framework for specification, implementation, compilation, verification and 
adaptation to ensure behaviour of the composed system consistent with the requirements 
for trustworthiness -- that is, enabling systems that are inherently trustworthy by 
construction 
• Partition complexity into analyzable compositions of analyzable components, including 
seamless compositions of hardware, software, and networking across multiple abstraction 
levels 
• Synthesize resilient systems that dynamically reconfigure themselves in responses to 
faults, attacks, and new requirements 
Characteristics of Composability 
• We must be able to combine different entities and different kinds of entities in predictable 
ways.  
 This requires well-defined specifications and interfaces, with no adverse effects, 
and corresponding analyses 
 Composability must be anticipated by design in system architectures and analysis 
methodologies. 
 Composable recovery and re-execution are also important. 
 Composability must itself be monitored, measurable, and analyzed 
Execution—Composition Moves 
• Research and development of a general theory and practice of composition 
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• Projects should be undertaken in multiple problem domains to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the methodology, including the interrelationships among components, 
interfaces, and analyses 
• Research to support languages spanning composition to program execution and hardware 
Timeframe 
• Predictable composability is a strategic challenge that is  amenable to a concerted long-
term effort while providing valuable intermediate advances.  There would be continuing 
returns on this investment indefinitely.  It can enable a major reorientation of the entire 
system development process. 
• In combination, we need predictably composable architectures with trustworthy 
components such as servers, network hosts, embedded systems, and operating systems, 
descriptive languages for structured composition, safe programming languages, 
appropriate new hardware, and supporting development tools.  All of these can contribute 
as they are developed. 
Barriers and Synergies 
• Existing technologies do not scale 
• Past research must be considered where applicable, but has not addressed predictability 
or scalability 
• Composability must interact with other thrusts such as assessment, architecture, and 
recovery. 
End States 
• Coherent  and systematic modernization of system development, streamlined 
configuration management, operation, causally informed monitoring, automated  
dynamic adaptation and recovery, focused maintenance, predictable upgrading, and agile 
long-term evolution 
• Demonstrably trustworthy components and their compositions, quantitatively  and 
qualitatively evaluated throughout design and runtime (see Assessment and Assurance), 
applied to environments such as distributed networked applications, critical 
infrastructures, and other domains, with specific demonstrations and documentation of 
success cases. 
7.3.5. Thrust 2: Assessment: From Science to Demonstration 
Overarching metacapability encompassing trust, engineering and science; engineering recovery; 
and architecture 
Characteristics of Assessment 
• Evaluation of systems must be pervasive throughout the development cycle. 
• Monitoring, measuring and evaluation of systems during operation are also essential. 
• Assessment must be composable and  encompass relationships among different 
components, layers of abstraction, interfaces, successive evolutions, formal and informal 
analyses throughout the lifecycle. 
Relevant Moves—Assessment 
• Support fundamental research in metrics and benchmarks 
• Establish supporting models that can scale to large systems 
• Develop tools and technologies to support the metrics and the methodologies 
• Establish federated testbeds for  hardware, software, network, and policy experimentation 
• Perform rigorous evaluations based on models 
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• Perform evaluations of the effectiveness of the methodologies  
Execution—(Composition Moves) 
• Research in rigorous models for trustworthiness  encompassing security, reliability, 
survivability, safety, interoperability, maintainability, and other critical requirements 
• Research in creation and use of models 
• Support for experimental science and technology 
• Research in measurement and auditing technologies 
• Mapping the metrics to models 
• Driven by real applications in defense, financial, power, health, and other sectors 
throughout the lifecycle 
Complementary Moves 
• Develop predictable composable trustworthy systems 
• Engineer trustworthy systems 
• Establish high-assurance development and operational environments 
• Leverage, extend, and virtualize existing testbeds 
Barriers and Synergies 
• Past investment in security metrics has not been commensurate with reality, despite some 
successes for reliability, safety, correlated failures, and formal methods. 
• Analytical methods do not scale easily. 
• Much can still be learned from successes, within the overall rubric of trustworthiness 
End States 
• Coherent and systematic modernization of assessment of high-assurance systems: 
 Demonstrably composable trustworthy systems and networks quantitatively and 
qualitatively evaluated against critical requirements 
 High-assurance extended to dynamic changes and system evolutions 
Future Impact 
• December 7, 2007 Washington Post.Com 
• “The Army isn't as far along with the software that will connect the drones, robots and 
weapons in a network. The software development is an "unprecedented undertaking," the 
largest in Defense Department history, In 2003, when the project began, the Army 
estimated it would need 33.7 million lines of code; it's now 63.8 million.  
• Another problem is that the Army is giving itself only a dozen years from the time of the 
program's official launch to field a brigade with eight manned combat vehicles linked 
with six unmanned vehicles, drones, robots and sensors involving about 50 critical 
technologies, said Paul L. Francis, the GAO's director of acquisition and sourcing 
management. "We've never done a tank in five years," he said. That alone could take 10 
to 15 years, involving about five critical technologies, he said. 
 
7.3.6. Thrust 2a: 50% increase in “trust” engineers and scientists 
Increase “trust” engineers and scientists (domestic BS/BA degrees) by 50% 
Capabilities: 
 College freshmen and K-12 outreach (math proofs; introduce conceptual 
programming methods;  pervasive presence of software and protocols in all 
realms of engineering (how things work); convey importance/ethics/basic 
principles of security) 
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 Public relations (poster of Shania Twain debugging a LISP program) 
 That “trust” engineering is multidisciplinary may itself serve to improve 
recruitment 
 Maintain, amplify domestic competitive advantage 
7.3.7. Thrust 2b NCDI Research Institutes and Project Funding System 
Capabilities: 
• Create infrastructure (physical or virtual) and management plane to ensure development 
of 
 needed human resources and  
 teaming / competition framework targeting specific research thrusts and success 
criteria 
 accommodating sabbaticals, internships, leaves with respect to multiple (physical) 
institutes 
• Engage multiple disciplines and perspectives 
 academe,  
 government, 
 commercial equipment vendors,  
 content and service providers, and  
 commodity ISPs 
• Maintain and improve domestic competitive advantage 
7.3.8. Thrust 3: Private sector engaged 
End State 
Create enough incentives for industry to implement and deploy security services 
 In the manner analogous to evaluation of economic indicators such as consumer 
satisfaction, foster creation of metrics to determine the incentives raised by 10% 
per year 
• In relation to other end-states’ security product requirements, per year, cause a 50% 
increase in the amount of deployment of the necessary products 
 
Vignette 
• Necessarily interdisciplinary team assess cyber banking infrastructure 
 Carriers/ISPs 
 Vendors 
 Gov’t and academic security analysts  
 Business, economics 
• Publishes a report in March 2009 that projections in March that cyber infrastructure is 
25% more secure and/or available by some group of metrics over last year 
• End result is improved valuation of assessed financials  
Moves 
• Educate security experts on commercial development and deployment cycle for new 
technologies and new architectures, and vice versa, education IT vendors, carriers et al on 
security in general, including innovative research 
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• Open broader collaboration among security experts, economic and management experts, 
social and political scientists etc. in order to deepen understanding and develop moves 
related to incentives for security deployment in innovation 
• Recommend reasonable, unbiased government regulations in concert with economic 
incentives 
7.3.9. Thrust 4: Shared insight into future tech vectors  
End-State Details 
• As IT innovations are deployed, there are procedures and/or agencies in place to assess 
any security implications and mitigate security risks subsequent to deployment  
Research Thrusts 
• For those emerging technologies not specifically targeting trust: 
 identify potential trust “disruptions” 
 investigate potential security benefits 
• Fund research on complex interactions newly of deployed IT technology and apps 
• Seek any realistic opportunities to develop secure clean-slate networking technology 
Vignette: billing system for end-to-end tiered services  
• If usage-based, there is a measure of end-system authentication 
• This can possibly be exploited for flow attribution end-to-end 
• Leading to a preliminary attribution system that is sensitive to confidentiality (a la opt-
in/opt-out caller ID in PSTN)  
Moves 
• For those emerging technologies not specifically targeting trust: 
 identify potential trust “disruptions” 
 investigate potential security benefits 
• Fund research on complex interactions newly of deployed IT technology and apps 
• Seek any realistic opportunities to develop secure clean-slate networking technology 
Vignette: Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) and Exfiltration 
• DPI deployed to filter malware and ostensibly benign traffic in violation of terms of use 
• NSA aware of DPI filter configurations 
• Encode secure documents so that they will be dropped by network-deployed DPI filters 
• Note: need to consider layer-4 segmentation and reassembly.  
• Alternative approaches, e.g., automatically tagged packets upon Tx that are 
(automatically) dropped by packet filtered upon receipt by domestic gateways  
Vignette: new networking paradigms such as IPv6 and wireless  
• Foreign build-out of IPv6 leading to issues of competitive advantage, compatibility, 
MAD (not sure about limited IPv4 address space motive considering NATs) 
• Clean slate opportunity to design secure design name resolution and routing protocols 
relatively unimpeded by backward compatibility issues suffered by new IPv4 protocols. 
• New regulatory opportunities re. security standards of clean slate networking protocols. 
• WTH, why not design IPv? 
 
7.3.10. Thrust 5: Operate Through Adversity 
End State: 
Provide effective mission capabilities in the face of adversarial efforts to thwart the mission 
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Possible Intermediate Capabilities 
• No buffer overflows 
• No (spear) phishing attacks 
• Detect all vulnerabilities we know about 
• Reduce attacker’s capability to ours, whatever the level. 
Rationale 
 The adversary will always be on our system & network 
 Attacks will be (at least) partially successful 
 Mission objectives must be achieved in spite of #1 and #2. 
 Security is a game; we need to effectively use defense recourses because the 
normally has a multiplication factor  
Synergies 
• Collaborative Defense 
• Trustworthy Composition 
• Online Integrated Assessment 
Barriers 
• There is no such thing a perfect security 
• Mission objections are not always  clear 
• Priorities are not well established 
• Capability must be designed in from the start; retrofitting will lead to marginal benefits at 
best 
• Attacker could manipulate adaptive nature of system 
•  Difficult to know when we have succeed; careful assessment required 
Why Now? 
• Many parts of the problem have been solved in other domains 
 Detection capabilities 
 Autonomic response capabilities 
• Build upon results from past Govt programs in core technology 
• Speed of technology turn offer allows us integrate by design 
• Community understands that protection along will not succeed 
• Computation power exists to implement solution without sacrificing mission performance 
Move 1: Improve boundary defense 
• Build boundary defenses that can succeed against unknown attacks 
• Execution 
 Understand both static and dynamic boundaries 
 Collect vulnerability information from all sources 
 Synthesize into vulnerability-based rules 
 Automate collection and synthesis process 
• Timeframe 
 3-5 Years 
Move 2: Build effective attack containment capability 
– Define and Implement boundaries for static and dynamic containment with acceptable 
likelihood 
– Execution 
• Architect  appropriate attack containment granularity 
• Create HW, SW, and protocol support for attack containment implementations 
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• Improve identification and authentication for communication among regions 
• Specialize implementation by creating  containment rule wrt mission & policy 
– Timeframe 
• 3-5 years 
Move 3: Improve attack discovery capability  
• Determine whether attacker is present  
• Execution 
 Integrate existing attack discovery technology 
 Create novel detection techniques 
 Understand attack propagation space; place sensors at points that have greatest 
impact. 
• Timeframe 
 3-10 year 
Move 4: Retrospective Forensic Capability 
• Store the necessary information to determine attack parameters; analyze data looking for 
common features that might indicate an attack 
• Execution 
 Determine appropriate data to do analysis in the fact in limited storage capabilities 
and increasing data rates, e.g., error reporting 
 Create Capability to find associated patterns in data 
• Timeframe 
 3-7 years 
Move 5: Create semi-Autonomous Response Capability to Contain, Recover, Repair 
– Restore critical mission functionality with high reliability in a timely manner 
– Execution 
• Create methodology from determining, specifying, and reasoning about response 
effectiveness 
• Create testbeds for experimentally investigating response approaches 
• Create methods for arguably safe response 
– Timeframe 
• 5-10 years 
Move 6: Increase Adversarial Uncertainty 
– “All warfare is deception” – Sun Tsu 
 Deny the true, Project the false 
– Execution 
 Increase the size of the state space, e.g., improve the quality of Honeynet 
technology 
 Develop techniques for covering events (e.g., traffic) 
 Randomize the identities and locations of assets 
– Timeframe 
 3-10 years 
Quantification 
Size of the multiplier presented to the adversary 
– Is the mission successful? 
 Eventually? 
 Within a time bound? 
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 With a certain probability? 
 With certain constraints on attacker behavior? 
 Within the rule of engagement? 
 At what cost? 
• Can we reduce attacker’s capability? 
 Arbitrarily? 
 To a certain minimal level? 
 Within a certain time bound? 
– Regarding progress toward the mission’s success: 
 Can we recover from complete loss of mission capability? 
 Can we make constant forward progress? 
7.3.11. Thrust 6 : Develop Required Human Resources 
Move 
 Create unclassified national security research institutes 
 Academic, private, and government players  
 Leaves of absence, internships, sabbaticals 
 Intellectual property issues 
 Revamp individual proposal funding processes wrt education 
 Longer term grants consistent with graduate student life-cycles 
 Additional funding to increase research base 
 Recruitment  
 Draw attention to robust job market in related disciplines 
 Develop research interests in K-12 and freshmen undergraduates 
 Targeting under-represented minorities 
Rationale 
 Within 10 years sufficient domestic IT security personnel for national cyber 
security infrastructure R&D and ops 
 Critical application driven research across multiple research topics 
 Challenge problems  
 Efficient project management so as to minimize research overhead while 
preserving accountability 
 New kinds of x-disciplinary skill-sets are required to achieve collective objectives 
 Foster teaming and competitiveness 
 
7.3.12. Vision-ette: SCADA System Operation Through Attack 
• The attack discovery system notices a number of unusual accesses to several Power 
SCADA control systems in the Monterey area (move 3). 
• A query to the forensics system (move 4) reveals a few rarely seen errors have been 
observed for this collection of systems. 
• Based upon the combined evidence, respond by temporarily limiting access (move 1 and 
2)  to other SCADA system components in the area and notify forensics personnel (move 
5). 
• Decision:  
 Deploy SCADA honeypots looking to capture the attack vector (move 6). 
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 Restore normal communications with enhanced monitoring & detection 
capabilities (move 1). 
• Detection capabilities discover an attack against a honeypot (move 3); forensic capability 
(move 4) confirms attack in question was launched against the systems. 
• Analysis determines: 
 The attack is designed to modify control settings on the targeted SCADA systems 
 Discovers the vulnerability the attack exploited 
• Updated vulnerability-level signatures are deployed (moves 1 & 5). 





• Improve boundary defense 
 Build boundary defenses that can succeed against unknown attacks 
• Build effective attack containment capability 
 Define and Implement boundaries for static and dynamic containment with 
acceptable likelihood 
• Improve attack discovery capability 
 Integrate existing attack discovery technology 
 Create novel detection techniques 
System of Systems  
Increase Adversarial  
Uncertainty 
Semi-Autonomous 
Response Capability to 
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 Understand attack propagation space; place sensors at points that have greatest 
impact. 
• Retrospective Forensic Capability 
 Determine appropriate data to do analysis in the face of  limited storage 
capabilities and increasing data rates, e.g., error reporting 
 Create Capability to find associated patterns in data 
• Create semi-Autonomous Response Capability to Contain, Recover, Repair 
 Create methodology for determining, specifying, and reasoning about response 
effectiveness 
 Create testbeds for experimentally investigating response approaches 
 Create methods for arguably safe response 
• Increase Adversarial Uncertainty 
 Increase the size of the state space, e.g., improve the quality of Honeynet 
technology 
 Develop techniques for covering events (e.g., traffic) 
 Randomize the identities and locations of assets 
7.3.13. Vision-ette: Assuredly Predictable Composable Systems 
• If mechanisms implementing all of the desired trustworthy system requirements (secure, 
reliable, survivable) can be compromised, then any trust mechanism can be bypassed. 
• Instead of strength in depth, we presently have weakness in depth.   
• This must be avoided. 
Vignette 
• Situation: Alice and Bob (aka Blue Pill Attack) 
 Alice has secure virtualized host 
 Bob has device driver 
 Bob get’s Alice to load the device driver 
 Bob puts Alice into an emulated Windows Image 
 Bob is running Alice’s hypervisor 
 Alice cannot easily notice that Bob has compromised her 
• Alice’s vulnerabilities 
 Unenforceable separation 
 Impossible to assess consequences of composition 
 Myriad vectors to compromise 
• Alice’s only hope is full reengineering of her “trusted” computing platform 
 Assuredly predictable composition is essential 
Implications 
• Assuredly predictable composition is an absolutely essential technological thrust. 
• Otherwise, the U.S. will become a second-class power, militarily and economically. 
• Benefits for national leadership in computing and networking 
 U.S. Government systems  
 Major civilian IT including critical infrastructures 
 Economic competitiveness (100x productivity gain) and jobs 
 Science and technology infrastructure 
  Education 
Composition End State 
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• Coherent and systematic modernization of high-assurance systems: 
 Trustworthy systems 
 Streamlined configuration management, operation, monitoring, dynamic 
adaptation and recovery 
 Focused maintenance, predictable upgrades 
 Agile long-term evolution 
Assurance End State 
• Coherent and systematic modernization of assessment of high-assurance systems: 
 Demonstrably composable trustworthy systems and networks quantitatively and 
qualitatively evaluated against critical requirements 
 High-assurance extended to dynamic changes and system evolutions 
7.3.14. Vignette: Composability/Assessment 
• DoD needs to procure a complex new system.  With  hierarchically sound architecture 
and assessment of composed systems -- encompassing hardware, operating systems, 
networking, and applications as appropriate, architecturally and analytically ensuring the 
relevant trustworthiness aspects  (security, reliability, system survivability, …) -- 
unprecedented advances are possible in system trustworthiness, speed of development, 
compatibility, operational simplicity, long-term evolvability, cost,  manageability. 
• This approach would be applicable to a wide range of developments, including embedded 
systems (e.g., critical infrastructures, databases, trusted enclaves), multi-purpose systems 
(the Global Information Grid), and many others. 
8. Lessons Learned/Observations 
The following are observations and insights offered during a “hotwash” review at the end of the 
workshop.  They were offered by different people and thus they may not always flow smoothly 
nor may they be consistent in aggregate. 
 
There are policy complications that must be considered.  These include economic analysis 
including the cost structure of what people are already doing as well as examination of what 
people are willing to pay for. 
 
To influence markets, it is imperative that the markets to be influenced be understood. This 
means that Return on Investment (ROI) studies are needed. 
 
Absence of hobby horses on display (complement to the workshop participants). 
 
The presentations need to be raised from the nerd level up to the Dick and Jane version needed 
for some less technical members of the leadership. 
 
Infrastructure upgrades constitute “real money.”  People will not be willing to pay in loss of 
capability and compatibility for security. 
 
Selling measurement was a geek comment – we know too little and this often results in the 
wrong things. 
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Don’t want people trying to solve toy problem. Instead, help real companies with real solutions.  
The VAX SEVMS was a toy problem  
 
The “Hello Mama” vignette was the only one that would appeal to the general 
population/audience.  Some of the vignettes were not comprehensible and would be much less so 
to less technically astute listeners. 
 
The nation is struggling with the problem of determining an overall cyber security strategy. 
This workshop shows that such a strategy is technically feasible (good). It is imperative that we 
think through the defense (a “cost center”) against deterrence (a “profit center”) 
 
It is hard to sell security. A positive motivation is needed since corporations want to make 
money.  Need to show how security will help sell product.  The Intel security mechanisms are 
being provided to customers as services.  For example the “momma” service is about 
manageability and for businesses this is attractive since they are looking for economic ways to 
manage complexity. 
 
Government will not fix problems, but government can help with the infrastructure. 
 
It was unusual to generate the vignettes at the end of the workshop, rather than at the beginning.  
He noted that by doing this, ideas were clarified and this may help clarifying workshop outcomes 
to Congress and the public. 
 
The workshop made a lot of progress and we came much closer to the goals many in Washington 
are seeking.  The workshop clarified how moves related to capabilities.  (For this, stratification 
of the architecture was a good example.)  A reviewer suggested that the group go back and take 
another look at moves for which there are not end states: have we not thought about them 
sufficiently? Should they be there?  Do we not understand what is needed? 
 
The results of the workshop were somewhat uneven and some of the work will need to be moved 
up to the same level as other components of the effort. 
He would like quantitative measures of the end states, as this could help prioritize investments. 
 
We should not say that “we have seen all of this before”. 
We need better justification and understanding for why problems have not yet been solved by 
technologies that were suggested in the past. 
 
We are still in the “mess”. 
This workshop helped expose more people to our concerns, yet we still need to include others. 
 
Recommendations are still needed. 
 
A set of practical and policy actions that will do something to address the problem are needed.   
This may include: standards, cajoling, etc. 
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In terms of the workshop, the set of recommendations is too long and some are impractical.  
Examples of the latter included stratification of the networks and imposing liability. 
Where is the detail for how to create capabilities? 
What state do I get to and how do I get there: vision and plan. 
 
The essence and considerations have been revealed.  We have not leapt, but have made some 
solid incremental progress. 
 
The security community is wounded – it has been beaten up for years.  We need to turn up the 
gain on what is possible.  To date, the offense has gotten the big dollars.  Now try to make it 
defense’s turn: think big and be brazen.  This is an urgent problem. 
 
We need things that are pragmatic 
We need to think big in terms of achieving capabilities 
 
The groups had insufficient time to work on the work plan. 
Research thrusts were really the best output from group C given the time available. 
 
Someone asked for a vignette workshop. 
 
People would have liked to have had more structure.  There was a lot of uncertainty WRT the 
workshop activities. 
9. Future Work 
o Fund the continuation of the analysis process started in this workshop with a handful of 
very experienced people in the field with security engineering, research, and operational 
backgrounds.  Identify the most critical moves and lay out actions over the near, medium 
and long term for those moves. 
o Examine moves for which there were no corresponding end-states to determine their 
importance and relevance. 
o Explore the possible quantification of end-states so that investment might be prioritized. 
o Engage a cadre of top key technical leaders from industry from the beginning to 
determine ways to affect change consistent with the mechanisms and behavior of 
commercial markets. 
o Hold a series of follow-on workshops over the next 12 months with domain experts (e.g. 
power, banking, and telecommunications), technology experts, and industry experts to 
extend the plan.  Involve Government agencies responsible for security R&D and for 
these sectors, initially through the NCO’s CSIA. 
10. Conclusions 
• A focus on protection of the most critical information infrastructure elements from 
strategic damage is essential. 
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• Connecting a bottom-up “moves” approach with a top-down “end-state” approach 
broadened thinking, yet quickly brought focus on key strategic moves and will produce new 
technology that meets the needs of critical applications. See slides for example analysis. 
• Developing and sustaining human capital (smart, well-trained people) is essential to all 
important endeavors in both the near- and long-term. 
• A strategy for understanding and influencing commercial markets is a prerequisite of 
any move.  Industry should be actively engaged in developing this strategy. Pragmatic 
solutions and incentives are needed.  Some of the key vendors are fully engaged in the 
NCDI community, but more have to be involved and soon.  
• We should be careful not to undervalue ideas and concepts as “old” because they have 
been previously identified and discussed.  Many have never actually been tried in earnest 
and translation of these notions to the current context will be required.  The workshop 
participants believe that many of the key ideas are ready to be incorporated into design and 
evaluation methodologies.  
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11. Appendix A:  Opening Moves Stimulus Paper 
Opening Moves in Cyber Defense, by O. Sami Saydjari, Cyber Defense Agency 
11/13/07 
 
Recent events have made it clear that nation-states are developing significant capabilities to 
wage cyber war.  It can be said that a Cyber Sputnick has been launched into cyberspace by 
China, and we must scramble to meet the resulting challenges.  We can not afford to lose the 
cyber space race. 
 
This paper assumes that leadership decides to take dramatic and aggressive action to better 
provide for the common defense of U.S. Cyberspace in a National Cyber Defense Initiative 
(NCDI).  This paper describes good opening moves in the start-up of such a major initiative. 
 
Each action is called a move in the sense that each is intended to be a game-changing event.  
Each move follows the following form. 
 
Problem:  This is a statement of what part of the problem is to be addressed by the move, why it 
is a problem, and why its solution could have significant impact on improving cyber defense 
posture. 
 
Move:  This is a description of the proposed action to address the stated problem and what the 
outcome of the move is intended to be. 
 
Rationale: This is an explanation of how the move addresses the problem and why this move is 
expected to be effective and how it might enable other moves or depend on other moves. 
 
Execution: This section is meant to give a high level sketch of how the move ought to be 
implemented, principles by which it should be implemented, and perhaps identification of how it 
should not be implemented based on past experience.  It is not meant, at this stage, to be a 
detailed implementation plan. 
 
Timeframe: When should this move be initiated and when will it pay off, characterized in one of 
three main buckets: short-term (0-3 years), medium term (3-6 years), and long term (7-10 years). 
11.1. National Cyber Risk Assessment 
Problem: Determining the right measures and investment levels requires understanding the 
potential of cyber attack, the degree of national strategic damage and the source of the risk (e.g. 
key sectors like power, telecommunications and banking that are the foundation of our critical 
infrastructure).  There is much debate on the national strategic damages that the U.S. would incur 
from a strategic cyber attack.  Some think, for example, that 70% of the U.S. power grid can be 
brought down and held down for months.  This is indeed an event that would challenge our very 
sovereignty.  Others say that our systems are robust and that estimates of damages are 
exaggerated.  This degree of difference in technical opinion creates paralysis amongst key 
decision-makers.   
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Move:  Establish a blue ribbon panel to settle the technical debate and conduct a national cyber 
risk assessment to come up with a definitive statement of the degree and nature of the risk.   
 
Rationale:  Understanding the national cyber risk posture will help policy makers establish the 
appropriate level of investment and priorities for cyber defense.  Secondly, the assessment must 
determine specifically where the risk comes from in key sectors like power, telecommunications 
and banking that are the foundation of our critical infrastructure.  This determination facilitates 
planning and ordering of mitigation strategies. 
 
Execution:  This investment planning move will be most successful if executed by an unbiased 
panel without a direct financial stake in the funding that results from the risk assessment 
findings.  A Congressional Special Commission or the DARPA JASONs are examples of groups 
that may have such properties.  Additionally, the group must be given unfettered access to key 
decision makers and relevant data.  Many moves depend on this analysis and the situation is 
urgent, therefore, incremental results are required which can be achieved through a series of 
spins: 1 day, 1 week, 1 month, 3-month, 6-month, 1-year. 
 
Timeframe: This move must be started immediately and is thus short term.  A process to 
continuously update the risk assessment is needed, therefore it must continue through the 
medium term as well.  Risk assessment, particularly quantitative risk assessment, is in its infancy 
as applied the security realm, thus long-term research is needed to improve risk assessment as a 
science. 
11.2. Set Risk Threshold Standards [Prevention] 
Problem:  Move 1 will identify the largest contributors to the national cyber risk such as the 
trend in the power industry to integrate their business systems with the process control systems.  
While this trend increases the power industry’s billing efficiency it may be unwise in that it 
creates indirect access by attackers from the internet to critical control systems, possibly an 
unacceptable level of risk. 
 
Move: Balance the rush to integrating all of our systems for efficiency with the risk from cyber 
attack and establish industry wide thresholds for acceptable levels of risk.  Continuing with the 
example, a standard might be set to disconnect these networks and endure the additional 
operating costs associated with the severing of those connections.  So the move would set a 
threshold level of risk we would be willing to take and determine the actions to achieve that 
threshold in the immediate term. 
 
Rationale: Critical sectors such as power, banking and telecommunications, are not incentivized 
to provide for the common defense, particularly against nation-state actors.  The market is 
pressuring increasing levels of integration.  The consequences of these integrations are poorly 
understood.  The heavy cost of widespread failures due to cyber attacks are not born primarily by 
the system owners but are shared by society.   Therefore the federal government must set the 
standards on behalf of the common interest of the society.  These moves would likely result in 
immediate and significant risk reduction while intermediate and longer term moves come to 
fruition and can reduce risk while maintaining efficiency. 
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Execution: Three participant classes are required for the success of this move: (1) top military 
attack planners who deeply understand how to attack national-level infrastructures to do strategic 
damage, (2) top industry technical experts such as operationally-savvy Chief Technology 
Officers, and (3) top industry business experts who deeply understand the economics and 
business processes.   Start this move by focusing on the top three critical infrastructures (power, 
telecommunications and banking) and expand to other sectors later.  The output should be a set 
of qualitative standards driven by a set of principles, and a series of interpretations per industry 
of specific actions to be taken immediately.  This activity should follow the spin-cycles 
mentioned in Move #1.  Setting economic incentives to do the right thing may be an important 
action within this move. 
 
Timeframe: Standards setting is primarily a short-term move.  Standards will need to be revised 
as our understanding of the science improves, as our understanding of risk improves, and as 
system architectures change, but this becomes a maintenance issue. 
11.3. Cyber Indications and Warning Capability [Detection] 
Problem:  Currently, we are approximately blind to the most sophisticated cyber attacks that we 
can hypothesize making it difficult to react and respond.  Damages will likely grow 
exponentially with time as the effects of strategic cyber attacks go unmitigated.  Additionally we 
cannot distinguish sophisticated threats from playful ones. This lack of awareness is troubling 
because the appropriate response is not easily identified. 
 
Move: Develop a capability to immediately detect strategically damaging attacks as efficiently as 
possible.  
 
Rationale: Damages will likely grow exponentially with time as the effects of strategic attacks go 
unmitigated.  We need to know when we are under strategic attack (vs. some lower-level attack, 
or vs. a failure), preferably where it’s coming from, and what the goal of the attack is so that we 
can understand where it might be headed.  Early intervention and action is essential.   
 
Execution: Start by analyzing likely attack scenarios, the resulting evidence of those attacks, and 
design custom sensors specifically to detect the attack evidence. These sensor grids must cross 
multiple critical infrastructures because the attacks certainly will.  We must do this in a way that 
preserves privacy and other constitutional rights of citizens. This will require the design of a 
cross-industry domain sensor grid, correlation facility, and warning system.  The sensor grid will 
need to include intelligence feeds for what is happening beyond U.S. borders—cyberspace is not 
bounded by geography.  Cyberwar playbooks will need to be developed and integrated into 
strategic responses in serious cyber war games and linked into the situations. Infrastructure will 
need to be created to efficiently and effectively execute the most important courses of action. 
 
Timeframe: Developing the ability to see sophisticated attack is urgent and thus must be though 
of as a short term move.  The science of detection and the principles of deploying sensor grids is 
probably a medium term aspect of the move. 
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11.4.  Rearchitect the Critical Information Grid [Prevention] 
Problem: The critical information grid is the collection of computers and networks which, if 
attacked, could cause strategic damage to the country.  The current architecture of this grid is not 
robust against attack for at least two reasons: (1) the way existing technology, both security and 
functional technology, is deployed and operated is not as robust against attack as it could be, and 
(2) technology (such as operating systems, network devices, etc.) needs significant improvement 
to defend against strategic attack.  Normal market forces does not create the natural incentives 
for such robustness against such attacks to evolve because it is a matter of “providing for the 
common defense” as opposed to a matter of competitive edge. 
 
Move: Develop security architecture guidelines, supporting tools, and worked examples to 
facilitate securing existing enterprise networks.  Create economic incentives to address risks 
from nation-state actors.  Work with critical information grid sector leaders to rearchitect critical 
systems such as the telephone network and identify all the changes (political, legal, economic, 
technical, etc.) that must be made to realize the more robust architectures.  Identify and invest in 
advancing key technologies, such as operating systems, that will have the most profound affects 
on reducing risk across the board. 
 
Rationale: The problem comes partly from ignorance on how to secure systems, partly from the 
lack of economic incentives, and partly from the best people not feeling enabled to do what 
needs to be done for the nation.  All three of these aspects need to be addressed at the same time. 
 
Execution: Guidelines should be developed on a sector-by-sector basis by domain experts in that 
sector combined with security architecture experts and advanced red teams who know how to 
take apart those systems.  These teams should be given a year to come up with their technical 
architecture and the plan to realize it, including non technical issues that must be addressed.  The 
existing sector coordinating councils will not suffice in that they do not have the charter nor the 
right mix of people to accomplish the goal. 
 
Timeframe: The process of rearchitecting critical systems is a urgent short-term action.  Much 
can be done right away.  Some architecture changes may required significant investment and 
wholesale replacement of information infrastructure, or the creation of parallel infrastructures, 
such projects are almost certainly medium-term projects.  Advancement and deployment of new 
technology is medium to long-term. 
11.5.  National Cyber Disaster Response Team [Reaction] 
Problem:  Industry network operators are not trained or experienced in dealing with national 
level cyber attacks.  In addition, in the event of a national cyber attack, our top defenders will not 
be able to communicate and share their observations and reactions.  Estonia may well be a case 
study? http://www.internetnews.com/security/article.php/3678606 
 
Move: Create a team of the top cyber operations experts from the hyper-critical domains and 
enable them to defend the country in time of emergency.  The team must have the clout and 
operating capability of a cyber Special Forces unit.  The group must be able to act as a team and 
plan together, train together, and operate together throughout the year.  Special hardened 
infrastructures may be needed to support this capability. 
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Rationale: Given the current state of national strategic vulnerability, we must assume that a first-
strike attack would be crippling in a way described by the Dark Angel analysis.  The goal of the 
response team is to minimize damage.  The attackers will have the element of surprise.  They 
will consist of the most capable, creative, and intelligent “A Team” the adversary has.  There is 
no substitute for creativity and intelligence on the defensive side both in situation understanding 
and in course of action analysis.  We need our top defenders defending our cyberspace. 
 
Execution: Choose the best of the best operators from both military and the hyper-critical 
industrial sectors and create a special infrastructure to support both planning/exercise activities 
and operational coordination in time of crisis.  Course of action in response to hypothesized 
situations must be developed and analyzed up-front as part of this team’s operations.  They will 
need a robust direct line to the commander-in-chief and other high-level leaders to recommend 
some of the courses of action that require national attention.  The team must meet periodically to 
do their planning and they must have lab facilities to conduct experiments.  A team of 25-30 
people who work well together would be ideal. 
 
Timeframe: A response team can and should be set up immediately and thus is primarily a short-
term move. 
11.6. Recovery Plan—Rebooting the Country [Recovery] 
Problem:  Given the current state of national strategic vulnerability, we must assume that a first-
strike attack would be crippling to U.S. national security by corrupting our hypercritical services 
and their back-up systems.  We can not afford to be fumbling for a plan in the midst of an attack.  
Our ability to coordinate planning and execution will be severely limited in the aftermath of a 
strategic cyber attack.   
 
Move: Plan for a fast recovery of hypercritical services by creating resources and facilities that 
support a fast reboot.  The recovery plan must be robust enough to sustain a sneak attack on it 
prior to the attack on primary systems and an all-out attack on it during the rebooting process.  
This requires deep analysis on the types and nature of attacks and ways to mitigate those attacks.  
Multiple recovery paths for each service may be needed. 
 
Rationale: Damage by a first-strike attack can be significantly mitigated by being able to bring 
key services back online quickly.   
 
Execution: This is not just a plan for backup generators lasting 3 days, for example.  This is 
about strategic re-creation of critical capabilities that are severely damaged while under 
continuing cyber “fire.”  It is about creating strategic reserve capabilities and resources and 
automatically triggered courses of action in the face of lost capabilities.  Recovery will have to 
be semi-autonomous and distributed in nature.  Significant budget and expertise will be required 
to create the capabilities needed for recovery. 
 
Timeframe:  Recovery plans are needed immediately and best-effort plans should be developed 
now.  At the same time, new capabilities will certainly be needed to improve response plans.  
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Such projects, such as building a core power grid that can reboot the rest of the grid, will 
certainly be medium term, although it will need to be started in the short term. 
11.7. Cyber Science – Countering the Growing Threat 
Problem: Physical sciences associated with chemical, biological and nuclear threats have long 
enjoyed preference and priority over cyber system research and development within DoD and 
DHS.  The ever-increasing pervasiveness of information technology in the fabric of all facets of 
our society and day-to-day life indicate that the threat and potential employment of strategic 
cyber attack against our Nation in undreamed of scenarios will continue to increase and become 
as devastating to society as any existing weapon of mass destruction.   
 
Move: Establish cyber science and cyber defense technology development as a top national 
priority within the Nation’s educational and research structure.  Provide university grants and 
scholarships to promote the growth of a cadre of people well-founded in and dedicated to cyber 
technologies and cyber-security. 
 
Rationale: An educated and growing cyber-defense cadre is vital to thwarting the increasing 
cyber threat of the future.  A strong scientific foundation in science is essential to making fast 
progress in the area.  Our current foundations are very weak. 
 
Execution:  Establishment of the requisite cyber science and research cadre will require a long 
term program developed by the US Government in concert with the Nation’s educational system.  
The government must move back to a model of building communities of sustained research at 
major centers that are competing with one another for the best ideas.  This means moving away 
from the model of research on 18 month deadlines.  A minimum of 5 year investment at major 
centers with the best people, each focus on a different domain, that have specific research goals 
to create a specific capability is needed.  An example of this would be Project MAC at MIT 
(started back in 1963) resulting in the Multics secure operating system. 
 
Timeframe: The development of science is a long-term move that needs to be begun in the short-
term.  We could start seeing major pay-offs in the medium term if foster correctly. 
   81 
12. Appendix B:  Non-Group-Vetted Materials 
12.1. Vignette 1  
Scenario: Homeland Security 1st Responder 
Objective: Create a collaboration environment that permits access from disparate sources. 
Situation: 
• An explosion occurs at an oil refinery in the gulf and a fire ensues. Local rescue 
authorities answer the emergency and begin to try to contain the fire 
• Local authorities report to DHS and FEMA to ensure public safety 
• The cause of the explosion is unknown and a task force has to be created between 
local, state, and federal authorities across different agencies. 
• A collaborative workspace must be created  
o to create a common operational 
o to share different views based on clearance and need-to-know 
  need-to-know may override clearance. IOW classified info may be 
given to uncleared personnel if need-to-know is determined (RADAC) 
 
Assumptions/Needs 
• Participants enrolled in Emergency Response System. 
• Participants provided with Biometric controlled proximity access cards 
• Communications/access clients are provisioned dynamically from network. 
o Dynamically launch and “Blue Pill” a platform to permit access to 
collaboration environment and legacy environments simultaneously. 
o Access is allowed based on user’s identity and an attestation of the 
provisioned environment. 
12.2. Vignette 2 
Scenario:  Terrorist attack warning at 2008 Olympics 
Objective: Counter the terrorist attack and protect citizens in country. 
Situation 
• China has provisioned the Olympic village with a community network to support 
the participants, media and visitors. A communication-rich environment. 
• Chinese intelligence has agents in the Olympic village 
• Participating countries have intel presence in respective embassies and covert 
agents as participants and visitors. 
• An indication from Israeli intelligence that there will be a terrorist attack against 
an uncertain target. 
• Israeli informs allies of the threat. 
• A COI has to be created to share information about the threat. 
o Includes Israel and its allies 
o Includes International Law Enforcement 
o Includes Chinese government as host security force 
o protected access to covert forces in village is used to task them and share 
COP with them 
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o protected access to embassy intel is used to share COP with them and 
coordination a protection plan for citizens in China 
Challenges:  
• How do we extend and protection to parties in COI?  
• How to protect mission from observation of world wide media? 
• How is Federation created and managed? What had to be pre-placed? 
• How is access control managed in collaboration COI environment? 
• How are different information feeds created and protected? 
o How are sources and methods protected? 
 
